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 Why Who Does What Matters:  
Governmental Design, Agency Performance, the CFPB and PPACA 
 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic1 
 
Abstract 
How should the federal government be organized – and who (i.e., which 
departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what?  The 
issue is not new: President James Madison addressed governmental 
organization in his 1812 State of the Union Address, and in the last century, 
it is the rare President that does not propose to reorganize some part of the 
federal government. Indeed, on numerous occasions during the past century, 
virtually every part of the federal government has been repeatedly 
reorganized and reconfigured. In previous work, we examined the dynamics 
that influence the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those 
dynamics (and the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and 
how the specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes affect 
agency decision-making. In this article, we focus on the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Using the framework we developed 
in our previous work, we examine the costs and benefits of the design 
choices made by the architects of the CFPB, and make some (appropriately 
hedged) predictions about the future prospects of this latest addition to the 
federal bureaucracy. We also briefly consider the implications of our 
analysis for the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“PPACA”).  
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We live and do business in the Information Age, but the 
last major reorganization of the government happened in the 
age of black-and-white TV. There are 12 different agencies 
that deal with exports. There are at least five different 
agencies that deal with housing policy. Then there’s my 
favorite example:  The Interior Department is in charge of 
salmon while they’re in fresh water, but the Commerce 
Department handles them when they’re in saltwater. I hear it 
gets even more complicated once they’re smoked. 
President Barack Obama (2011)2 
 
There are four different kinds of bears in the United 
States, and, of course, all these bears come under the 
jurisdiction of one Government department or another. I 
think it is the brown bear that comes under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of the Interior, and I think the black bear 
comes under the Department of Agriculture; and the Alaska 
bear comes under the Department of Commerce; and 
jurisdiction over the grizzly bear is held by the Department 
of War. That has been going on from time immemorial in 
Washington. Each bear - the care of the bear and everything 
else about the bear - falls under a different department, 
depending on the genus of the bear. And I am told 
confidentially that sometimes there is a most awful mixup, 
because sometimes a black bear falls in love with a brown 
bear, and then nobody knows under what department the 
puppies belong. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1928)3 
 
If we shouldn’t have twelve agencies dealing with exports, and five 
agencies dealing with housing policy, and two departments dealing with 
salmon, and four agencies dealing with bears, then how many agencies and 
departments (and which ones) should be responsible for exports, housing, 
salmon, and bears?  Does it really matter whether salmon are the sole 
responsibility of the Department of Interior (Fish & Wildlife Service) or the 
                                                
2  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Jan. 25, 2011, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-
address  
3 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Extemporaneous Campaign Address, Binghamton, N.Y., 
Oct. 17, 1928, available at 1 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 16 
(1938).  
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Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”))?  What difference would it make if Interior and 
Commerce were stripped of responsibility for salmon, and sole authority 
was assigned to the Food & Drug Administration (currently responsible for 
salmon once it is packaged) or the Department of Agriculture (which is 
responsible for catfish)?  And, while we’re at it, why is NOAA in the 
Department of Commerce, and why is regulatory authority over catfish in 
the Department of Agriculture?  More broadly, even if these particular 
allocations of responsibility are not optimal, might there be some utility in 
shared or overlapping authority/responsibility – and if so, under what 
circumstances?  
These issues are policy perennials. 4   President James Madison 
addressed governmental organization in his 1812 State of the Union 
Address,5 and over the course of the last century, it is the rare President that 
does not propose to reorganize at least some part of the federal 
government.67   
                                                
4 Cf. Gary L. Wamsley, et al. Bureaucracy in Democratic Governance, 80-81 in THE 
STATE OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, Larry B. Hill, ed. (1992) (observing that reorganization 
is the “cod liver oil of government--an all purpose cure for whatever ails the body politic.”) 
5  President James Madison, State of the Union Address, Nov. 4, 1812, at 
http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/24.html (“I can not press too strongly 
on the earliest attention of the Legislature the importance of the reorganization of the staff 
[military] establishment with a view to render more distinct and definite the relations and 
responsibilities of its several departments. That there is room for improvements which will 
materially promote both economy and success in what appertains to the Army and the war 
is equally inculcated by the examples of other countries and by the experience of our 
own.”) 
6 Peri E. Arnold, Reforms Changing Role, 55 PUB. ADMIN. L. REV. (1995) (“President 
Clinton is the thirteenth president in this century to initiate or embrace comprehensive 
reorganization or reform, using those terms interchangeably.”)  See also Peri E. Arnold, 
Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1996 
(University Press of Kansas, 1998).  
More specifically, President Franklin Roosevelt conducted a bruising multi-year fight 
to reorganize the federal government, culminating with the creation of the Federal Security 
Agency. President Truman oversaw the unification of the Department of the Navy and the 
Department of War under a single Department of Defense in 1949. President Johnson 
oversaw the creation of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and 
Transportation. President Nixon proposed to reorganize seven departments (Agriculture, 
Commerce, Health, Education & Welfare, Housing & Urban Development, Interior, and 
Labor) into four super-departments organized along functional lines (Community 
Development, Economic Resources, Human Resources, and Natural Resources), and was 
responsible for the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. President Carter 
oversaw the creation of the Departments of Energy and Education, and also proposed two 
additional Departments – a Department of Development Assistance, and a Department of 
Natural Resources. President George W. Bush oversaw the merger of components of 
twenty-two separate agencies into the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) -- which 
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President Obama called for governmental reorganization in both the 
2011 and 2012 State of the Union Addresses, and recently proposed the 
creation of a single cabinet-level department responsible for “boosting 
American business and promoting competitiveness.”8  President Obama 
also oversaw the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010, which shuttered one 
agency (the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)) and merged its functions 
into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and created a new 
bureau within the Federal Reserve (the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”)).9   
Reorganization has also figured in presidential campaigns and 
primaries. President Carter ran on a platform of reorganizing government. 
And, during the 2012 presidential primaries, four of the Republican 
candidates promised to “reorganize” parts of the federal government. 
Governor Rick Perry committed to eliminate three cabinet-level 
departments, but memorably could only come up with two departments 
(Education and Commerce) when asked during a November, 2011 debate.10  
Representatives Newt Gingrich and Michele Bachman both promised to 
shutter the EPA.11  Representative Ron Paul wanted to close five federal 
departments: Education, Commerce, Energy, Interior and Housing and 
Urban Development.12   
To summarize, on numerous occasions during the past century, 
virtually every part of the federal government has been reorganized and 
reconfigured. In the process, entire departments, agencies, bureaus and 
commissions have been created, moved, consolidated, divided, turned 
                                                                                                                       
was itself reorganized two years later. For details, see generally THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
(JOEL D. ABERBACH & MARK A. PETERSON, EDS. (2005).  
7 http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm  
8  Matt Compton, Making It Easier to Do Business in America, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/13/making-it-easier-do-business-america; Mark 
Landler, Obama to Ask Congress for Power to Merge Agencies, N.Y. Times A1 (Jan. 13, 
2012); Binyamin Applebaum & Helene Cooper, White House Debates Fight on Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES A1 (Aug. 13, 2011).  
9 http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/ots-bowman-dodd-frank-2669814-1.html  
10 Ed O’Keefe, What Do The Departments of Commerce, Education and Energy think 
of Rick Perry’s plan? WASH POST FEDERAL EYE, Nov. 10, 2011 at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/what-do-the-departments-of-
commerce-education-and-energy-think-of-rick-perrys-
plan/2011/11/10/gIQAXiSe8M_blog.html. See also Mark Schmitt, Let’s Get Real, No 
One’s Eliminating Any Cabinet Departments, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 2011, at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/97327/perry-debate-oops-cabinet-energy-commerce   
11 John Broder, Bashing EPA is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2011, at A1.  
12  Ron Paul, 2012 Restore America Now, at http://www.ronpaul2012.com/the-
issues/ron-paul-plan-to-restore-america/.  
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upside down and inside out, and infrequently eliminated entirely.13 Inter-
agency working groups, coordinators, and “czars” have come and gone, 
along with multiple shifts in responsibility for particular firms, industries, 
and areas of law.  
Why all this fuss over organization?  Simply stated, what an agency 
is assigned to do and where it is located matters. As Professor Amy Zegart 
aptly observed:  
   
organization is never neutral. As any Washington taxi 
driver can point out, government organization has serious 
implications for policy outcomes. It matters who has the 
information, who has the jurisdiction, who has the last word. 
It matters whether intelligence is collected by diplomats or 
spies, whether international negotiations are conducted 
through the Department of State or through back channels in 
the White House. . . When it comes to selecting, shaping, 
and implementing. . . policy, the devil often lies in the details 
of agency design.14  
 
In previous work, we analyzed the dynamics that influence the 
assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and the 
allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the specific 
combination of regulatory functions and purposes can affect agency 
behavior. 15   In this article, we apply the framework we previously 
developed to the CFPB. Created as a result of the 2011 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the CFPB is an independent 
entity within the Federal Reserve, with responsibility for consumer 
protection in financial products and services. Combining issues that had 
previously been handled by seven different federal agencies, the CFPB has 
regulatory oversight over banks, credit unions, securities firms, mortgage-
                                                
13 Donald F. Kettl, Reforming the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, 345, 346, 
Table 1 in Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6; RONALD C. MOE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
RENEWAL: REORGANIZATION COMMISSIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2003).  
14 AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 
I-II (1999).  
15 David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy 
Portfolios: Divide or Conquer? 2013 Concurrences, available at 
http://www.concurrences.com/Journal/Issues/No-1-2013/Articles/Competition-agencies-
with-complex; William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Competition Agency Design: 
What’s On the Menu? 8 European Comp. J. 527-538 (2013). See also David A. Hyman & 
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and The Goals of 
Competition Law, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2163-2174 (2013).  
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servicers, payday lenders, debt collectors, and other financial companies.16  
The CFPB has a diverse array of tools available to prevent “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive” acts or practices in the financial services sector.  
The CFPB has been mired in controversy since it was first proposed, 
including disputes over how it should be structured, where it should be 
located within the federal bureaucracy, and what powers it should exercise. 
Because our past work helps cast light on these issues, we analyze the 
CFPB as a case study of the complexities and contingencies of agency 
design.  
Part II provides a historical perspective on the complexities of 
designing a public agency. Part III introduces our analytical framework for 
analyzing the problem of agency design. Part IV specifies seven factors that 
we believe have proven significant in the success (and failure) of various 
past combinations of functions. Part V applies our analytical framework to 
the CFPB. Part VI considers two other issues: the implications of our 
findings for administrative law, and for the design of other entities. Part VII 
concludes.  
 
II. Designing a Regulatory Agency: Who, What and Where?  
How should the federal government be organized – and who (i.e., 
which departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what? 
When a law is passed, should responsibility for enforcing it be given to an 
existing department, agency, bureau, or commission -- and, if so, which 
one?  If responsibility is given to a new department, agency, bureau, or 
commission, where should it be located in the bureaucratic firmament?  
The examples in President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union 
(exports, housing, and salmon) suggest that these organizational issues are 
straightforward, and that inefficiencies are specific and isolated. Indeed, the 
graphic that accompanied the on-line version of the State of the Union, 
reproduced below as Figure 1, suggests that the problem is a bit of a joke, 
and that is easily remedied once it is recognized as a problem. In fact, as 
detailed below, the duplication and “jurisdictional chaos” that give rise to 
the demand for government reorganization are policy perennials.  
  
                                                
16 The seven agencies are the Federal Reserve Board; the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of Thrift Supervision; 
the National Credit Union Administration; the Federal Trade Commission; and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
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Figure 1: Allocation of Regulatory Responsibility for Salmon 
 
Source: 2011 Enhanced State of the Union Address Graphics, 
slide 54, available at http://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/2011-
enhanced-state-of-the-union-address-graphics   
 
A. How Frequent and Severe is the Problem? 
The problem identified by President Obama in his 2011 and 2012 
State of the Union Addresses is pervasive and longstanding, and it has 
proven remarkably resistant (if not completely immune) to repeated reform 
efforts. Over the past century, numerous public and private blue-ribbon 
commissions, task forces, advisory councils and working groups have 
studied how to reorganize the federal government. The conclusions of the 
National Commission on Public Service in 2003 are typical:  
The federal government is a flotilla of many distinct 
organizational units. Virtually every year new vessels are 
added to respond to the demands of the time. Occasionally, 
in response to a broadly perceived national emergency, the 
vessels are regrouped. . . Virtually never are they combined 
to eliminate program duplication. Missions are not realigned 
or even rationalized. Program laps upon program. 
Responsibilities are not coordinated. . .Those who enter 
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public service often find themselves at sea in an archipelago 
of agencies and  departments that have grown without logical 
structure, deterring intelligent policymaking. The 
organization and operations of the federal government are a 
mixture of the outdated, the outmoded and the outworn.17 
 
The 2003 Volcker report provides some concrete examples of the 
magnitude of the problem:  
Prior to the post 9/11 reorganizations, over 40 federal 
agencies were involved in activities to combat terrorism. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development operates 23 
self-sufficiency and economic opportunity programs that 
target tenants of public housing and other low-income 
clients. Responsibility for federal drug control strategies and 
their implementation is fragmented among more than 50 
federal agencies. There are over 90 early childhood programs 
scattered among 11 federal agencies and 20 offices. Nine 
federal agencies administer 69 programs supporting 
education and care for children under age five. There are 342 
federal economic development related programs 
administered by 13 of the 14 cabinet departments. Seven 
agencies administer 40 different programs that have job 
training as their main purpose. At least 86 teacher-training 
programs in nine federal agencies fund similar types of 
services. . . There are 50 homeless assistance programs 
administered by eight agencies. . . 29 agencies collectively 
share responsibility for federal clean air, clean and safe 
water, and better waste management programs.18 
 
Analogous paragraphs can readily be found in the reports issued by blue 
ribbon commissions, task forces, and other entities over the course of the 
20th century.19  Yet, despite regular reorganizations, the problems persist – 
                                                
17 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PUBLIC SERVICE, URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: 
REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Jan. 2003), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf (hereinafter “Volcker 
Commission”), at 36.  
18 Volcker Commission, supra note 17, at 36-37.  
19 Taft, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton used 
advisory commissions to review the structure and performance of the federal government. 
The GAO has also issued periodic reports on the problem of duplication. Government 
Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government 
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (March 2011), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP. A 2012 report from the GAO 
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and, if anything, have gotten worse over time.20  
Ironically enough, given the after FDR’s 1939 reorganization of the 
federal government, he had to resolve a dispute over which of two 
Departments (Interior and Agriculture) should have jurisdiction over the 
breeding and raising of fur bearing animals.21  Roosevelt settled the dispute 
with a tongue-in-cheek note that referenced the story of the four bears.22   
President Roosevelt had to deal with such issues on other 
occasions, including turf battles between the FBI and the Office of 
Coordinator of Information (“OCI”), and the FBI and the Office of 
Strategic Services (“OSS”). 23   For example, when OSS agents 
burglarized the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C. in October, 
1942, the FBI sent two cars to the embassy, arrested the OSS agents, 
and sought to bring criminal charges -- jeopardizing the security 
interests of the United States in order to protect its turf.24  Although 
the OSS was ultimately replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the turf war has continued to the present day.25     
                                                                                                                       
noted that some progress had been made, but most of the organizational chaos remained. 
Government Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Feb. 2012), at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf.  
20 On the frequency of reorganization, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 212 (2000) (“During the 1960s, 270 
federal offices were created, 109 were abolished, 61 were transferred, and 109 had their 
names changed. From 1953 to 1970 the Office of Education was reorganized six times and 
the Food and Drug Administration eight times.”) 
21 In 1939, the Bureau of Biological Survey (Agriculture) and the Bureau of Fisheries 
(Commerce) were transferred to Interior to form the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The 
American Fox and Fur Breeders Association proposed to have fur-animal research 
(previously handled by the Bureau of Biological Survey) transferred back from Interior to 
Agriculture. HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION AND POWER 88 (Oxford U. Press, 
1970). 
22 See Id: 
I agree with the Secty of the Interior. Please have it carried out so 
that fur-bearing animals remain in the Dept. of Interior. You might find 
out if any Alaska bears are still supervised by a) War Dept., b) Dept. of 
Agric. c) Dept. of Commerce. They have all had jurisdiction over Alaska 
bears in the past and many embarrassing situations have been created by 
the mating of a bear belonging to one Dept. with a bear belonging to 
another Dept. 
P.S. I don't think the Navy is involved, but it may be. Check the   
Coast Guard. You never can tell.) 
We are indebted to Alvin Felzenberger for calling this episode to our attention.  
23  FRANCIS MCDONNELL, INSIDIOUS FOES: THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN AND THE 
AMERICAN HOME FRONT 170-171 (Oxford, 1995).  
24 Id.  
25 See, e.g., MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: FROM PEARL HARBOR TO 9/11: HOW THE 
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More recent examples are easy to find. Why do 15 federal agencies 
share responsibility for food safety – with the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) responsible for cheese pizza, and the Department 
of Agriculture responsible for pepperoni pizza? 26   Why is the FDA 
responsible for bottled water, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) responsible for tap water?27  Why is the safety of drinking water 
on airlines jointly regulated by three federal agencies, with the 
determination of the responsible agency contingent on where the water is 
physically located, and the form that it takes (e.g., is it bottled water, tap 
water, or ice, coffee and tea)?28  Why are federal financial literacy efforts 
“spread among more than 20 different agencies and more than 50 different 
programs and initiatives”?29  Why does regulatory responsibility for eggs 
bounce between the FDA (Department of Health & Human Services) and 
the Department of Agriculture, depending on whether the egg is inside or 
outside of the chicken, and whether or not the egg is in the shell, or has 
been cracked open?30  How many Institutes should there be in the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), and should they be organized around specific 
diseases, organ systems, life stage, field of science, or the 
profession/technology?31  Why is the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) located within the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) instead of NIH or within the Department 
of Labor?32  Why do four federal agencies have authority over outer 
                                                                                                                       
SECRET WAR BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE CIA HAS ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY 
(2002).  
26 Jane Black & Ed O’Keefe, Overhaul of Food Safety Rules in the Works, WASH. 
POST, July 8, 2009.  
27 General Accounting Office, Bottled Water: FDA Safety and Consumer Protections 
Are Often Less Stringent Than Comparable EPA Protections For Tap Water (June, 2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09610.pdf.  
28  EPA, Aircraft Water Drinking Rule, 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/rulesregs/sdwa/airlinewater/regs.cfm. See also 
http://aircrewhealth.com/Topics/hazards/waterquality.htm.  
29  GAO, Financial Literacy: The Federal Government's Role in Empowering 
Americans to Make Sound Financial Choices, GAO 11-504T, at 
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d11504thigh.pdf 
30 Karen Tumulty & Ed O’Keefe, The Government tends to resist reorganization, 
WASHINGTON POST, Jan 28, 2011, at A1.  
31 As it happens, NIH has institutes organized around all of the above possibilities. 
There are nine disease-focused institutes; four organ system-focused Institutes; two 
Institutes focused on life stage; three Institutes focused on a particular field of science; and 
two Institutes that focus on a specific profession or technology. See Michael McGeary & 
Philip M. Smith, Organizational Structure of the National Institutes of Health, unpublished 
background paper on file with authors (2002) 
32 Congress put NIOSH in HHS (then HEW), rather than Labor to distance it from the 
“highly political workplace enforcement environment.”  Denny Dobbin, Where to Put 
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space?33  Why did the State Department engage in a decades-long dispute 
with the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce over which department 
should be responsible for federal employees stationed outside the United 
States (usually within foreign embassies) who handled agriculture and trade 
promotion?34   
Why is the FDA responsible for both food and drugs, when there is 
effectively no real overlap between these two industries, other than for 
some dietary supplements?  Why is NOAA in the Department of Commerce 
and the Coast Guard in the Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. 
Public Health Service in the Department of Health & Human Services, 
when all three include significant uniformed services, like the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marines (all of which reside in the Department of Defense)?  
And, even if NOAA doesn’t belong in the Department of Defense, 
shouldn’t there be a better reason for why is it in the Department of 
Commerce than President Nixon’ personal pique at the then-Secretary of 
the Interior (which was the leading candidate for housing NOAA when it 
was created)?35  Why is the U.S. Forest Service (and responsibility for 
                                                                                                                       
NIOSH, MEDSCAPE PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE, May 31, 2005, at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/504483. Stated more concretely, there was a 
fundamental dispute between those who wanted the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) to aggressively regulate workplace health and safety and those 
who didn’t want there to be an OSHA at all. One part of the resulting compromise was the 
creation of two separate agencies (NIOSH and OSHA), put in two different departments 
(HHS and Labor, respectively), with NIOSH responsible for making recommendations to 
OSHA on workplace health and safety standards, and OSHA responsible for bringing 
enforcement actions and promulgating regulations. This structure effectively constrained 
OSHA’s ability to set its own regulatory agenda, since it could not do its own research on 
workplace safety. But see Andy Morriss & Susan Graham, Defining What to Regulate: 
Silica & the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 322-23 (2006) 
(“This separation of standard setting and enforcement from research ‘has its roots in the 
history of earlier occupational safety and health activities and conflicts between the 
Department of Labor and the Public Health Service.’”)  
When one of us (DAH) presented this paper, he asked the audience to vote where they 
thought NIOSH belonged (without revealing where it was currently located). Given the 
choice between the three locations in the text, the overwhelming majority voted to put it in 
the Department of Labor. Not one person voted to put NIOSH in the CDC.  
33 Tumulty & O’Keefe, supra note 30.  
34 On the dispute between State and Commerce, see MAURICE STANS, ONE OF THE 
PRESIDENTS’ MEN: TWENTY YEARS WITH EISENHOWER AND NIXON 212-214 (1995). See 
also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Agricultural_Service  
35 See Steven Eli Schanes, The Battle for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 1969-71, at http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/21/the-battle-
for-the-national-oceanic-and-atmospheric-administration-noaa/. See also Steven Eli 
Schanes, Putting NOAA Together- 1970, at 
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/putting-noaa-together-1970/; and Eileen L. Shea, 
A History of NOAA, at http://www.history.noaa.gov/legacy/noaahistory_1.html  
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National Forests) in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park 
Service (and responsibility for National Parks) in the Department of the 
Interior, when the territory being supervised is physically contiguous?36  
Why have the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) gotten into turf battles at crime scenes, even 
though they are both located within the Department of Justice?37  Why, 
when President Obama proposed to move NOAA from Commerce to 
Interior was the move opposed by both environmentalists and fisheries?38  
Similar difficulties were created by President Obama’s proposal in 
the 2012 State of the Union Address to move the U.S. Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) from its current location within the Executive Office of the 
President (“EOP”) into the proposed business and trade agency. Trade is a 
focal point for inter-agency conflict, with each agency emphasizing the 
issues of most important to its constituents: “Commerce Department 
officials continually urged U.S. trade negotiators to take a pro-business 
position, while State Department officials said that non-business foreign 
policy matters should determine whether the United States wanted to pursue 
an agreement or a liberalization or tightening up of trade rules.”39  USTR’s 
position in the EOP allows it to serve a trade coordination function, but 
subsuming it within a larger super-trade bureaucracy placed this role (and 
USTR’s flexibility and autonomy) at risk.40  Not surprisingly, USTR’s 
“clients” opposed the relocation/merger.41    
                                                
36 For the largely historical answer, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS IN 
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). See also HOWARD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, 
POSITIONS AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATION 126 (5th ed. 1998) 
(“The Forest Service might well be in the Interior Department today if the historic dispute 
between Secretary Ballinger and Gifford Pinchot had not left conservationists with a nearly 
pathological distrust of the department.”)  
37 Tumulty & O’Keefe, supra note 30.  
38 Charles S. Clark, Obama reorganization bid faces challenges on Capitol Hill, Jan. 
13, 2012, available at http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/01/obama-reorganization-
bid-faces-challenges-on-capitol-hill/35839/; Press Release, Fishermen wary of Obama’s 
reforms, Fishnewseu.com, Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://www.fishnewseu.com/latest-
news/world/7378-fishermen-wary-of-obamas-reforms.html.  
39  Reorganization Proposal could impact food safety, USTR, Hagstrom Report, 
available at 
http://www.hagstromreport.com/2012news_files/2012_0113_reorganization.html  
40 Daniel F. Runde & Meredith Broadbent, President’s Proposed Reorganization of 
Trade Agencies, Jan. 18, 2012, available at http://csis.org/publication/presidents-proposed-
department-trade-and-innovation.  
41 Those opposing the relocation/merger included two dairy associations (the U.S. 
Dairy Export Council and the National Milk Producers Federation) and the American 
Soybean Association. See USDEC, NMPF raise concerns about U.S. trade policy 
reorganization impact,  http://dairybusiness.com/seo/headline.php?title=usdec-nmpf-raise-
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The division of “ownership” over particular areas can result in 
problems when separate agencies share jurisdiction, and/or must coordinate 
their efforts.42  Profound difficulties can result when agencies do not “get 
along” or have conflicting assessments of the nature and seriousness of the 
“problem.”43  Even when agencies “get along” and agree on the nature and 
seriousness of the problem, they can have profound disagreements on the 
optimal solution, and which of the rival agencies is best situated to 
implement “reform.”  Conflicts within intelligence agencies, and between 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies are legendary. 44   A trivial 
example makes the point: when top brass at the CIA and FBI announced 
that analysts from each would be detailed to the other, so as to break down 
these barriers, personnel at both agencies referred to it as a “hostage 
exchange program.”45  As detailed below, inter-service conflicts within the 
Department of Defense are deeply rooted. Even the children of military 
personnel are rapidly socialized into the tribal nature of the individual 
services.46 
One final complication:  all of these examples assume the allocation 
of regulatory responsibility is static – but history makes it clear that the 
location of any given agency/bureau/regulatory function is actually quite 
fluid. The frequency of past reorganizations means that the “home” of any 
given function is far from permanent, and “it does not take much digging 
                                                                                                                       
concerns-about-u-s-trade-pol&date=2012-01-17&table=headlines ( 
42 See generally Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 
(2011). 
43 In re Aiken County, -- F.3d –, No. 10-1050 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This case is a mess 
because the executive agency (the Department of Energy) and the independent agency (the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) have overlapping statutory responsibilities with respect 
to the Yucca Mountain project.”) 
44 See AMY B. ZEGERT, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11 
(2007); Riebling, supra note 25; Luis Garicano and Richard Posner, What Our Spies Can 
Learn From Toyota, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2010) (“The national intelligence apparatus of 
the U.S. . . consists officially of 16 separate agencies, and unofficially of more than 20. 
Each of these agencies is protected by strong political and bureaucratic constituencies, so 
that after each intelligence failure everything continues pretty much the same and usually 
with the same people in charge.”)  
45 John Diamond, CIA & FBI in the Hot Seat, USA TODAY, June, 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002/06/04/hotseat-usat.htm (“As an 
illustration of the bad feelings between the two agencies, the practice of CIA and FBI 
analysts working at the other agency is referred to as a "hostage exchange program.”) 
46 MARY ELLEN WERTSCH, MILITARY BRATS: LEGACIES OF CHILDHOOD INSIDE THE 
FORTRESS 311, 312 (2006) (“When I was a young child, I understood that we were 
something called an ‘Army family’ although I had only a vague idea of what that meant. 
But I knew one thing for certain: We were most definitely not Navy. . . One Army 
colonel’s daughter told me her father refused to attend her wedding because she was 
marrying a Navy brat.”)      
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for an organization archeologist to uncover evidence of prior civilizations 
and cultures within the Executive branch.”47  Further, even completely 
“new” agencies and bureaus are usually cobbled together from “bits and 
pieces” of other agencies and bureaus.48  As Professor Daniel Carpenter 
observed, “the institutions of the future seem endlessly created from the 
organization of the past.”49  As we discuss in greater depth below, these 
complicated genealogies are the result of a polycentric, path-dependent, and 
intensely political process -- played out repeatedly, over many decades.50  
But, before we turn to a more systematic consideration of factors that affect 
the location and combination of functions for a public agency, Part C 
explains how the focus on “jurisdictional chaos” misses some of the gains 
from agency/regulatory duplication and overlap.  
 
C. Benefits of Agency Redundancy 
Framing the problem as “jurisdictional chaos” is rhetorically 
effective. After all, who could be in favor of chaos?51  But, if one unweights 
the rhetorical dice, and asks about the costs and benefits of 
agency/regulatory redundancy, the issue suddenly becomes less clear-cut. In 
an engineering context, redundancy is usually viewed as an essential 
attribute in creating a margin of safety. Although the Boeing 777 can fly on 
only one engine, no one thinks Boeing should just leave the second engine 
off.52  Computer users are supposed to back up their computer files – even 
though doing so is, by definition, redundant. As these simple examples 
                                                
47 Seidman, supra note 36, at 126.  
48 Wilson, supra note 20, at 55 (“Most new agencies are formed out of bits and pieces 
of old ones.”) 
49 Daniel Carpenter, The Evolution of National Bureaucracy in the United States, in 
ABERBACH &. PETERSON, supra note 6, at 41, 43 (New agencies are “built from existing 
agencies and institutions. The institutions of the future seem endlessly created from the 
organization of the past.”)  
50 See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure: A Perspective on 
Structural Politics, Self-Interest, and the New Social Regulation, in Can the Government 
Govern (John E. Chubb & Paul Peterson, eds.) (Brookings, 1989) (“American public 
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its 
design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political 
power.”); Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the 
Political-Bureaucratic System, in Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6, at 312, 315 (“Ex 
ante constraints are designed to mirror the political environment facing the enacting 
coalition and to stack the deck in favor of particular interests and to disadvantage others.”)  
51 But see Heathers (1988) (“Chaos was what killed the dinosaurs, darling.”)  Similar 
rhetorical tactics explain other labels, such as “smart growth” and “death taxes.” 
52 Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public Choice and Public Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK IN PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, D. Farber & A. O’Connell, eds. (2010), 
at 351 (“[R]edundancy is a standard design principle in both engineering and 
organizations.”)   
   
 
14 
illustrate, it is more useful to think about these issues in terms of the optimal 
level of agency and regulatory redundancy/overlap – a framing which 
necessarily requires balancing the costs and benefits of such strategies 
compared to the alternatives. The costs of redundancy/overlap are quite 
visible, and have attracted considerable attention. So, what are the benefits 
of redundancy/overlap?  More broadly, what explains the agency design 
choices that we actually observe?   
In recent years, a number of legal scholars have focused on these 
issues – usually in the context of disputes involving a single statute, agency, 
or substantive area of law. Professor Freeman and co-authors have outlined 
various ways in which the involvement of multiple agencies can influence 
agency decision-making for the better, by encouraging or requiring the 
“deciding agency” to take account of factors and goals it would otherwise 
downplay or ignore.53  Professors Weisbach & Nussim argue that we should 
consider tax preferences and spending programs in an integrated fashion, 
and highlight the organizational logic (focusing on specialization and 
coordination) of having overlapping programs run by separate agencies.54  
Professor Bradley suggests that the division of responsibilities between 
agencies, when coupled with a “rule-based interface,” helps coordinate 
resolution of complex regulatory problems and strengthens presidential 
control of the administrative state.55   
Professor Barkow explores the importance of agency design in 
resisting capture, particularly when dealing with asymmetrical political 
pressure.56  Professor Marisam suggests that “duplicative delegations” make 
it possible for the President to choose from a “menu of agencies” in 
deciding which agency is best situated to do what.57  Professor Biber 
highlights the challenges faced by multi-goal agencies, and explores the 
costs and benefits of various strategies to monitor and motivate such 
agencies to do better.58  
                                                
53 Jody Freeman & James Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARVARD L. REV. 1131 (2012); J.R. Deshazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as 
Lobbyists, 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2217 (2005); Freeman, Freeman urges coordination of 
agencies in shared regulatory space, Mar. 23, 2011, at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/03/23_jody-freeman-chair-lecture.html   
54  David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L. J. 955 (2004). 
55 Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 746 
(2011). 
56  Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 15 (2010). 
57 Marisam, supra note 42.  
58 Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-
Goal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2009). See also Eric Biber, The More The 
Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship, HARVARD 
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Professor Gersen emphasizes the benefits of overlapping jurisdiction 
in solving various agency problems, including bureaucratic drift, and the 
impact of agency design.59  Professor O’Connell highlights the role of 
rivalry between agencies with overlapping jurisdiction in encouraging 
higher quality intelligence.60  Professors Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast 
describe how the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
strengthened Presidential control and simultaneously promoted domestic 
policy priorities other than homeland security.61  
Professor Doran explores how the fragmentation of Congressional 
committee jurisdiction and parliamentary prerogatives help create 
redundancy, and explores the informational efficiencies and distributive 
consequences that result.62 Professor Macey analyzes the structure and 
design of administrative agencies in terms of their ability to reduce the 
agency costs that exist between Congress and the bureaucrats within those 
agencies, as well as to reduce the chance that “future changes in the political 
landscape will upset the terms of the original understanding among the 
relevant political actors.” 63  Finally, Professors McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast (McNollGast) explore how Congress can manipulate agency 
design and decision rules to “stack the deck” in favor of the outcomes 
favored by those responsible for drafting the legislation in question.64 
To be sure, we have only described the legal literature on these 
subjects. Political scientists and public administration scholars have spent 
decades working on these issues.65  Despite this limitation, our abbreviated 
                                                                                                                       
L. REV. ONLINE FORUM (2012), at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/march12/forum_868.php; 
59 Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201. In Designing Agencies, supra note 52, Gersen considers at 
greater length the public choice perspective on agency design, including the mechanisms of 
vertical and horizontal control.  
60 Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655 (2006). 
61  Dara K. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Weingast, Crisis 
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. (2006) (“By moving a large set of agencies within the department and instilling them 
with new homeland security responsibilities without additional budgets, the president 
forced these agencies to move resources out of their legacy mandates.”) 
62  Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 
Boston U. L. Rev. 1815 (2011)  
63 Jonathan Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992). 
64  Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 
(1989). 
65 See, e.g., KAREN M. HULT, AGENCY MERGER AND BUREAUCRATIC REDESIGN 
(1987); BERYL A. RADIN & WILLIS D. HAWLEY, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL 
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summary of the literature makes it clear that there are both costs and 
benefits to agency/regulatory redundancy. More importantly, dismissing the 
status quo as “jurisdictional chaos” provides no useful insight into how best 
to organize or reorganize, once there is agreement that the costs of a 
particular organizational structure/agency design exceed the benefits. In 
order to frame an intelligible response to that problem, one must consider 
how the location and the combination of functions and goals of a public 
agency affect its performance. We now turn to that issue.  
 
III. Public Agency Design 
A. First Principles 
Creating a public agency requires one to specify at least five major 
institutional characteristics: (1) the agency’s substantive regulatory 
responsibilities; (2) the location of the agency somewhere within the federal 
government; (3) the definition of the range of activity subject to the 
agency’s authority (e.g., economy-wide applicability or limitation to 
selected sectors or transactions only);  (4) the designation of the policy 
instruments that the agency may use in carrying out its duties (e.g., data 
collection and reporting, law enforcement, business and consumer 
education,  rulemaking, administrative adjudication, civil and/or criminal 
authority); and (5) the choice of a governance mechanism (management by 
a single unitary executive or a multi-member board). Of course, we do not 
propose to address all of these issues in this article; we are instead trying to 
give a sense of the scope and complexities that must be dealt with anytime 
one creates a new public agency.  
In a rough sense, the issues are similar to those considered by 
Professor Ronald Coase in the Nature of the Firm. One can frame these 
issues in various ways. For example, why do firms decide whether to carry 
out some functions themselves v. contract with others?  When firms are not 
able to do something themselves, when do they use contracts v. acquisitions 
                                                                                                                       
REORGANIZATION: CREATING THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (1988); WILSON, 
supra note 20; Aberbach & Peterson, supra note 6; DONALD F. KETTL, SYSTEM UNDER 
STRESS: HOMELAND SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2004); BERYL A. RADIN & 
JOSHUA M. CHANIN, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION: A POLICY AND 
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE (2009); Zegart, supra note 44; Zegart, supra note 14; DAVID 
E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 (2003). Professor Lewis, in 
particular, has devoted considerable effort to these issues, focusing on the interface of 
politics and agency performance. See http://www.vanderbilt.edu/political-
science/bio/david-lewis.  
Economists have also written about these issues, but they have spent considerably 
more time on the organization of private firms. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at 
983-993 for a review of the literature.  
   
 
17 
v. joint ventures?  Why do firms enter some product lines and geographic 
areas, and not others?  Are conglomerates, which participate in multiple 
independent and unrelated lines of business, a good idea or not?  How 
important are transaction costs (i.e., the relative costs of out-sourcing versus 
internal production) and product complementarities (i.e., should a 
manufacturer of mobile phones also make apps?) in defining the boundaries 
of the firm?    
These questions point to some of the complexities in thinking about 
the “optimal” boundaries for a government agency’s substantive 
responsibility. 66  The polar solutions are obviously silly: no one creates an 
agency and fails to give it something to do, and there are no takers for a 
“Department of Everything.”  In between, the dividing lines are less 
obvious: how does one decide whether a governmental agency should have 
N or (N+1) or (N+10) areas of responsibility?  What counts as a distinct 
area of responsibility?  Does it depend on whether the areas involve 
separate substantive bodies of law – and how are the boundaries of 
“separate substantive areas of law to be set?”  Should the same agency 
enforce both civil and criminal laws?  Should the agency combine 
legislative, judicial, and executive functions, or just two of the three – and 
which two?  What arrangement minimizes the possibility of capture by 
those being regulated?67  What arrangement will be most appealing to the 
Senators and Representatives who create the agency in the first place – as 
well as those charged with oversight and budgetary authority?  If another 
agency already occupies part of the field, should we expand capacity at the 
existing agency, add responsibility to the existing agency without 
expanding capacity, or create an entirely new agency?  Should we have 
multiple agencies responsible for the same general area – and if so, how 
should their jurisdiction be defined and enforced?  If we want closer 
coordination of policy and implementation, should we combine two (or 
more) agencies into one, or are other strategies (e.g., creating a coordinating 
council or a “czar”) more effective?  What are the differing consequences of 
creating a new agency, adding new functions to an existing agency, and 
reorganizing governmental functions?  And so on.  
To address these questions, we begin with an examination of the 
forces that have historically shaped the assignment of regulatory tasks to 
agencies.  
 
                                                
66 Some of these parallels are explored in Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private 
Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 17 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 306 
(1999). See also Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi & Schulz, The Two Dimensions of 
Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 56 (2006). 
67 Cf. Barkow, supra note 56.  
   
 
18 
B. Constructing The Regulatory Portfolio 
Unlike business firms, which set the boundaries of their firms 
through acquisitions, contracts, expansion and contraction, government 
agencies generally acquire substantive responsibilities through one of four 
paths: legislative choice; accident/fortuity; agency expansion into 
unoccupied policy space; and legislative divestiture.  
The simplest case is the assignment of specific functions to a 
particular agency by legislative action. But even here, there are 
complications, since regulatory authority may still be shared, concurrent, or 
exclusive.68  
Agencies can also acquire regulatory or operational authority by 
accident or fortuity. An agency with capabilities originally designed to 
serve one purpose may find those capabilities suitable for other analogous 
purposes – e.g., “if you’ve got a hammer, why not help other agencies with 
nails that need pounding?”  Thus, helicopters and warships used to deliver 
troops into combat also can be used to assist civilians suffering from natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes or floods. 
An agency’s regulatory jurisdiction may also be affected by agency 
action in response to changes in business products or technology. 69  
Consider privacy and data protection policies. Modern advances in 
communications and information services technology have dramatically 
expanded the ability of firms to collect and use information about consumer 
behavior and preferences. The United States does not have an omnibus 
privacy and data protection statute. Instead, we have statutes that regulate 
specific sectors (e.g., health care providers’ collection and use of data) or 
specific types of transactions (e.g., financial services), with regulatory 
authority dispersed among the agencies responsible for administering each 
of these statutes.  
The resulting policy vacuum allowed the FTC to emerge as the 
leading federal privacy agency, by virtue of several cases it brought against 
firms that failed to fulfill promises concerning data protection.70  The FTC 
                                                
68 There are numerous instances where regulatory authority is shared between a sector-
specific agency (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission in telecommunications) 
and a government body with a broader generic mandate to address certain categories of 
business transactions (e.g., the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the control of 
mergers). Alternatively, Congress can grant concurrent authority to two agencies, as is the 
case with the grant of merger control authority to the DOJ and the FTC. 
69  We exclude technological developments that cause Congress to act. So, the 
emergence of powered flight resulted in a new branch in the Department of Commerce, 
which ultimately became the FAA.  
70 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Electronics Company Agrees to 
Settle Data Security Charges; Breach Compromised Data of Hundreds of Consumers, Feb. 
5, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/compgeeks.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, 
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also issued a staff report in December, 2010, proposing a policy framework 
for handling privacy issues.71  The Department of Commerce has sought to 
play a role into the same policy space, triggering a behind-the-scenes battle 
for regulatory primacy, which Congress has not yet settled.72  In like 
fashion, the development of broadband networks has sparked a similar 
dispute between the FTC and the FCC over which agency will oversee this 
element of the communications sector. 
The same dynamic has played out in operational terms within the 
DOD on several occasions. Technological development invariably triggers 
intense contests to determine which of the uniformed services will control 
the deployment of weapons based on the new technology. Consider nuclear 
weapons. The Air Force and Navy sought to occupy the relevant policy 
terrain, devising solutions that were based exclusively on each service’s 
area of primary expertise. The Air Force emphasized long-range bombers 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles.73  The Navy built ballistic missile 
submarines and acquired carrier-based aircraft with the capacity to deliver 
nuclear weapons. The Army, which was not a major player in the fight, 
developed intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear-capable artillery 
pieces. Congressional appropriations to each service and allocations to 
particular weapon systems signaled the winners and losers of the ongoing 
fight for operational dominance.  
Finally, there is legislative divestiture. Perceived failure (particularly 
catastrophic failure) can result in divestiture of some of an agency’s 
functions, or outright closure/consolidation into another agency. As detailed 
                                                                                                                       
Iconix Brand Group Settles Charges Its Apparel Web Sites Violated Children's Online 
Privacy Protection Act, Oct. 20, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/iconix.shtm; 
Federal Trade Commission, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect 
Medical and Financial Privacy of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays 
$2.25 Million to Settle Allegations of HIPAA Violations, Feb. 18, 2009, at  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/cvs.shtm; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Says Mortgage 
Broker Broke Data Security Laws: Dumpster Wrong Place for Consumers’ Personal 
Information, Jan. 21, 2009, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/navone.shtm.  
71 See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework 
for Consumers, Businesses, and Policymakers, Dec. 1, 2010, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm  
72 See Press Release, Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting 
Consumer Privacy Online While Supporting Innovation, Dec. 16, 2010, at 
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveils-
policy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv.  
73 Interestingly, the Air Force was originally unenthusiastic about ballistic missiles, 
since they threatened the supremacy of the bomber, which dominated the Air Force culture. 
But, it was clear that the missiles were going to be acquired, so the Air Force “faced an 
awkward choice: either preserve the culture at the cost of letting the army and navy have 
what may turn out to be the weapon of the century, or get on the bandwagon at the cost of 
modifying the culture.” Wilson, supra note 20, at 105.  
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below, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in a fundamental 
reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) in the 
Department of Interior; the melt-down of the financial markets resulted in 
the shuttering of the OTS, and transfer of its functions to the OCC; the 
devastation of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina resulted in a 
reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and DHS 
was created in response to 9/11.74   
The different ways in which agencies acquire (and sometimes lose) 
portions of their regulatory portfolio has two distinct implications. First, the 
precise portfolio of responsibilities is never static – meaning that single 
function/purpose agencies are exceedingly rare. Second, this dynamism is 
affected by competition with rival agencies, and bureaucratic empire 
building. Agencies sometimes approach legislators to request ownership of 
a previously uninhabited policy area or simply seek to expropriate a portion 
of a rival agency’s portfolio.75   
Given these dynamics, it would be very useful to know which 
factors contribute to the success or failure of particular combinations, and 
the associated trade-offs. Part IV turns to this issue.  
 
IV. Who Should Do What: Seven Criteria  
How should we decide who should do what?  Based on our earlier 
work, we highlight seven criteria that reflect our reading of the factors that 
have historically affected agency design, location, and performance. Each 
factor should be assessed at the level of the agency/department, rather than 
any subdivision or bureau within the agency/department, since even facially 
absurd combinations can look sensible if you drill down far enough into 
each agency/department’s organizational chart.76   
                                                
74 Congressional Research Service, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes 
After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, Nov. 15, 2006, at  
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%
20After%20Katrina.pdf  
75 Some agencies share policy areas with other government bodies. In other instances, 
there is a common boundary, and agencies either contest the location of the property line, 
or technological change causes a shift.  
The process is no different than when a deed defines real estate ownership according 
to the course of a river. A change in the course of the river creates predictable change (and 
disputes) over who owns what. In property law, the boundary either moves along with the 
river (if the change is the recent of accretion) or remains where it was originally (if the 
change is the result of avulsion). This rule explains why although the Mississippi River 
generally forms the border between Tennessee and Arkansas (with Arkansas on the east 
bank, and Tennessee on the West bank), some of the land on the west bank is in Tennessee, 
and other land on the eastern bank is in Arkansas. See State of Arkansas v. State of 
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918).  
76 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at 958-959 (“Consider, for example, a 
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We note at the outset that the factors are “squishy,” inter-related, 
and are framed at a high level of generality. We offer them in the spirit of 
Weisbach & Nussim: even “relatively crude ideas. . . can help policymakers 
muddle through the problems they face.”77  
1. Policy Coherence 
How related and consistent are the functions that are to be 
combined?  In economic terms, are the functions complements or 
substitutes?78  Synergies and efficiencies are more likely to result if there 
are commonalities among the functions, whether derived from a common 
client population, type of regulated entity, temporal or physical 
commonalities (including but not limited to common inputs and/or outputs), 
or even just a shared intellectual framework regarding means and ends.  
Of course, policy coherence is not necessarily the highest priority – 
which explains why some Departments (such as Interior and Commerce) 
are little more than a collection of odds and ends.79  Indeed, the Department 
                                                                                                                       
proposal to have the IRS run the country’s defense system, replacing the Department of 
Defense. The proposal is not as silly as it sounds. It would not mean that bespectacled 
revenue agents would be parachuting into the Hindu Kush wearing night goggles, 
camouflage, and pocket protectors. Instead, an intelligent Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue would allow his employees to specialize. Revenue agents would specialize in 
reading financial statements and soldiers would specialize in fighting. Policies under such a 
proposal might very well continue much as they do today.”) With all due respect to 
Weisbach & Nussim, we think the proposal is exactly as silly as it sounds. The proposal 
ignores cultural differences between operators who perform these disparate functions, and 
the organizational structure that both creates and reflects the distinct cultures of the IRS 
and DOD.  
Consider two examples that help make the point. Crime fighting and domestic 
intelligence are far more tightly linked than tax collection and national defense, but cultural 
and organizational factors help explain the FBI’s failings in the latter area. See generally 
Luis Garicano and Richard Posner, Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics 
Perspective, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 166 (2005) (“If crime fighting requires a 
geographically decentralized organization with limited sharing of information and strong 
individual incentives based on outputs, but national-security intelligence requires a 
geographically centralized organization with extensive sharing of information and careful 
screening of inputs but low-powered incentives, the organization’s geographical, incentive, 
and information-sharing structure will either be an unhappy compromise or assure poor 
performance of one of the two missions.”)  See also RICHARD POSNER, REMAKING 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 10, 14-34 (2005). The Air Force is currently facing similar 
difficulties, in trying to adapt its longstanding officer-pilot based culture to the increasing 
use of UAVs. Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. Times M32 (July 8, 2012).  
77 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 54, at 997. 
78 The combination of complementary functions is more likely to result in synergies 
and efficiencies than the combination of substitutes. Indeed, the combination of substitutes 
may actually degrade overall performance if it gives rise to internal disagreements over 
which function should be given primacy. 
79 The Department of Interior, was created in 1849 by combining the General Land 
Office (from the Department of the Treasury), the Patent Office (from the Department of 
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of Interior has been described as “the Department of Everything Else,” the 
“Great Miscellany,” 80  a “slop bucket for executive fragments,” and a 
“hydra-headed monster.”81  John C. Calhoun predicted that “everything 
upon the face of God’s earth will go into the Home Department.”82   
This dynamic can also become self-reinforcing. The less coherent 
the combination of functions in a Department, the easier it becomes to add 
the next unrelated function or functions. The result is that some departments 
becoming little more than dumping grounds (or less charitably, garbage 
cans) for bureaus with non-overlapping portfolios.  
Even if the purposes are related, if they are at odds with one another 
the combination can lead to conflicts of interest, if not outright 
schizophrenia.83  Until it was reorganized in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”) in the 
Department of Interior was “charged both with collecting revenue generated 
by oil and gas drilling to fund the government, and with approving the 
permits that generate that revenue. . . [leaving the MMS] torn between 
whether to be a regulator or friend to industry.”84 
                                                                                                                       
State), the Indian Affairs Office (from the War Department) and the military pension 
offices in the War and Navy Departments. Subsequent additions included the census, 
regulation of territorial governments, exploration of the western United States, 
management of the jail and water systems in the District of Columbia, management of 
hospitals, universities, and public parks, and the colonization of freed slaves in Haiti. 
Department of Interior History, available at http://www.doi.gov/archive/history.html   
The Department of Commerce, is responsible for the census, patents and trademarks, 
weather forecasts, weights and standards, and fishing, among other subjects. Jim 
Kuhnhnen, Commerce Cuts Coming in Obama’s Reorganization, AP, Jan, 29, 2011, at 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12792513      
80  Robert M. Utley & Barry Mackintosh, The Department of Everything Else: 
Highlights of Interior History (1989), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/utley-mackintosh/interior2.htm 
81 Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman Vilas, Doctrinaire Democrat (Madison, Wisc., 
1954), pp. 134,139. 
82 Henry B. Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior, 16  AM. 
HISTORICAL REV. 751, 768 (1911). 
83 We focus on inconsistencies in ends or goals, but there can also be inconsistencies in 
preferred means, even when there is agreement on ends, at least at a high level of 
generality.  
84 Mark Jaffee & David Olinger, Tracking down Minerals Management Service’s 
dysfunctional history of drilling oversight, DENVER POST, June 6, 2010, at 
http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_15236764. In response to these criticisms, and the 
firestorm of Congressional disapproval that followed the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
Secretary of the Interior Salazar reorganized MMS into three separate entities. Press 
Release, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions, May 19, 2010, at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-
Missions.cfm  
Similar dynamics help explain the spin-off in 1974 of the National Transportation 
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Agencies with dual mandates, such as the Federal Reserve and the 
FAA are prone to similar difficulties. Since 1977, the Federal Reserve is 
charged with “promot[ing] effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.”  There is an obvious 
inconsistency between these goals – and the inconsistency makes the Fed 
less predictable, and more susceptible to political interference.85  The FAA 
is charged with “fostering air commerce,” as well as safety.86  When the 
issue attracted public attention, Congress responded by modifying the dual 
mandate, but the change had limited impact on the culture of the FAA.87  
One should not overstate the necessity for consistency within a 
single department or agency. Sound policy-making usually requires the 
balancing of competing interests. Consider banking regulation, where 
solvency must be balanced against consumer protection. If solvency and 
consumer protection are handled by distinct agencies, each will focus on the 
areas within their respective domains, and discount or ignore entirely the 
other’s area of responsibility. Yet, that approach is a recipe for regular 
battles between the agencies as to which should prevail on an issue that 
implicates both sets of interests. A decision balancing the relevant 
considerations will eventually have to be made by someone – either within 
a single agency, if both functions are combined, or at a higher level if the 
two (or more) involved agencies are unable to agree amongst themselves. 
Obviously, the mission and location of the CFPB, and the reorganization of 
MMS raise these issues in a very concrete way.88  
The problem gets stickier when the interests that must be balanced 
involve agencies with different goals and priorities.89  Which agency is the 
                                                                                                                       
Safety Board from the Department of Transportation, and the separation of the Atomic 
Energy Commission into the Energy Research and Development Administration and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Such splits can create difficulties when the separated 
agency is more susceptible to capture than was the case when it was part of a larger entity 
with a more diversified portfolio. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible 
Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 429, 465 (1999); 
Barkow, supra note  56. 
85 Compare George F. Will, The Trap of the Federal Reserve’s Dual Mandate, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 18, 2010 with Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Communications, Nov. 14, 
2007, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20071114a.htm 
86 MARY SCHIAVO FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 51, 65 (1997). (“If outsiders viewed 
the FAA as encumbered by a divided loyalty and hamstrung by its dual mandate, the FAA 
didn’t seem to share that confusion. The tombstone mindset made plain its loyalty to the 
cost-conscious interests of the aviation industry.”)  
87 Id. at 203, 206.  
88 Interestingly, the press release announcing the reorganization of MMS highlights the 
benefits of avoiding agencies with conflicting missions – but it says nothing about the 
necessity of integrating the conflicting decisions that will result from separate agencies.  
89 See Seidman, supra note 36, at 144 (“If agencies are to work together harmoniously, 
they must share at least some community of interests about basic goals. . . Senator Frank 
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“decider” will significantly affect the outcome of any given dispute, as well 
as whether particular circumstances count as “disputes.”  Each agency will 
predictably focus on the issues within their regulatory bailiwick, and be 
more attentive to the industries and groups they deal with most frequently. 
For example, we would expect DOD to focus on military preparedness and 
discount environmental concerns, while EPA would likely have the 
opposite tendencies. This dynamic results in predictable disputes between 
agencies with conflicting goals and priorities – including the dispute over 
the clean up of hazardous waste on military bases;90 the magnitude of the 
risk posed to endangered species and the general population by military 
training and technology;91 the environmental risks created by the Keystone 
XL pipeline; 92  and the balancing of industrial development (and the 
associated employment) against population health and environmental justice 
claims. 
 
2. Branding/Credibility  
A public agency’s “brand” conveys a message about the agency’s 
priorities and aims to both internal and external constituencies. The brand 
can become diluted and/or confused if the agency has too many 
responsibilities, or if the responsibilities are not complementary and 
consistent. A diluted/confused brand can create confusion for agency 
personnel about which projects ought to be selected; what theory ought to 
motivate the pursuit of individual matters; what decision rules should be 
applied to resolve disputes; and the relative priority and seriousness of 
                                                                                                                       
Moss ascribed the conflict between the National Park Service and the Army Corps of 
Engineers over the Florida Everglades to ‘uncoordinated activities. Park service officials 
complained that the engineers drained the Everglades National Park almost dry in their 
efforts to halt wetlands flooding and reclaim glad country for agriculture. The Army Corps 
of Engineers argued that wetlands were ‘for the birds’ and flood control for the people.”)   
90 Lyndsey Layton, Pentagon Fights EPA on Pollution Cleanup, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901977.html.  
91 See, e.g., Edward Walsh, Despite protest, Navy resumes bombing exercises on 
Vieques/Training interrupted briefly -- 14 arrests, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2001 (“The Navy 
resumed practice bombing on the small Puerto Rican island of Vieques yesterday, 
intensifying a debate that has pitted what the Navy says is the vital need for realistic 
training exercises against the health concerns of the island's population and the Puerto 
Rican government.”)   
92 Elana Schor, Canada-U.S. Oil Pipeline Poses Few Environmental Risks -- State 
Dept., N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2011 (noting that pipeline supporters view EPA as a “de 
facto ally of environmentalists. Robert Jones, vice president of the Keystone pipeline 
system at TransCanada, said earlier this month that ‘I want to be responsive" to EPA's 
concerns, but ‘the frustration I have is that I might as well be talking to NRDC or the Sierra 
Club.’”) 
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particular projects/matters. 93  Agencies with diluted/confused brands are 
more likely to be perceived as operating inconsistently. 
These branding dynamics also influence agency credibility. The 
better the reputation an agency has with Congress and congressional 
staffers, the more likely it is to receive adequate funding, and not be 
subjected to routine second-guessing/reversal. Similar dynamics apply in 
court; agencies get the deference that courts think they deserve – and 
reputation drives desert. Finally, the better the reputation an agency has 
with the parties it regulates, the more likely it is to be able to extract a 
favorable settlement without full-blown adversarial proceedings.94  
The bundling of functions also influences an agency’s reservoir of 
political capital. In our experience, regulatory bodies are continually 
engaged in a process of accumulating and spending political capital. 
Combining a function that generates political capital surplus with a function 
that runs political capital deficits may give an agency greater ability to 
perform deficit-prone functions that are important to the larger economy. 
Conversely, an agency whose portfolio of responsibilities ensures that it 
always runs a political deficit is an agency that has no constituency.95 
                                                
93 See Janice Revell, Interview with John Taylor, Money Magazine 93, 96 (Aug. 2012) 
(“The Fed needs to focus on a single goal of long-run price stability. We should remove the 
Fed’s dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices, which was put into effect 
in the 1970s. From 2003 to 2005, the Fed held interests rates too low for too long. A 
primary reason was its concern that raising rates would increase unemployment. . . More 
recently, the Fed has cited concerns over employment to justify its interventions, including 
quantitatitive easing. Removing the dual mandate would take away that excuse.”) 
(emphasis supplied).  
See also Wilson, supra note 20, at 55-59 (describing how the Economic Cooperation 
Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency were profoundly affected by the 
personnel they acquired from other agencies, given the open-ended nature of the original 
mandate (i.e. the brand) for each agency). Indeed, as Wilson concisely observes, “if a new 
agency has ambiguous goals, the employees’ prior experience will influence how its tasks 
get defined.”)  Id. at 55. See also Seidman, supra note 36 at 125-26 (“Government officials 
have an instinctive drive to reproduce the organizations, systems, and procedures with 
which they are most familiar. When asked to develop a self-financing plan for the rural 
electrification program, the Agriculture Department inevitably proposed an exact duplicate 
of the farm credit banks.”)   
94 At her first oversight hearing involving the nations’ financial regulators, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren asked each regulator the last time they had taken a major firm to court. 
None of the regulators knew the answer to the question. Although Warren’s question was 
hailed as welcome example of tough questioning, it actually betrayed a complete 
misunderstanding of how regulatory agencies actually work. More likely, Senator Warren 
knew that the question was misleading and deeply stupid, but asked it anyway, assuming 
the public would be taken in by her empty posturing.  
95 See Susan E. Dudley, Lessons Learned, Challenges Ahead: Is There a Constituency 
for OIRA, REGULATION 7-8 (Summer, 2009) (“OIRA’s mandate is to advance the general 
public interest. . . Hence there is no concentrated constituency for OIRA.”)  
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Such considerations help explain why agencies sometimes resist the 
addition of new responsibilities, even when acceptance would result in a 
greater budget and more visibility.96  A similar dynamic explains why 
agencies sometimes try to get rid of responsibilities that senior agency 
personnel believe detract from the agency’s core mission.97 
3. Capacity/Capability 
Agency resources are scarce, just like everything else. Assigning N 
+1 functions to an agency that only has the resources (whether measured by 
headcount, band-width, or credibility) to handle N responsibilities is asking 
for trouble. Stated differently, an agency with multiple discrete functions 
can easily find itself with too many things to do, relative to the pool of 
talent that it has available. One needs a critical mass of talent to do any one 
thing well; to do multiple things well requires both sufficient capacity and 
continuous fine-tuning of the agency’s allocation of resources.98  Absent 
such conditions, agencies will necessarily engage in policy triage. Agency 
employees will respond accordingly, sorting themselves to work in 
particular areas – with their choices dictated by their ambition and 
enthusiasm.99  The result is that some areas will flourish and others will 
languish – even if budgets keep pace with new responsibilities (which they 
almost never do).100  Triage is necessary if the agency is to keep its head 
                                                
96 Wilson, supra note 20, at 180 (“For years members of Congress tried to persuade J. 
Edgar Hoover that the FBI should take over federal responsibility for investigating drug 
trafficking.”)   
97 See Wilson, supra note 20, at 108-109 (noting that in 1973 and again in 1974, the 
Department of Agriculture tried to get rid of responsibility for the Food Stamp program, 
since it viewed itself as being in the “food business” – not the “welfare business.”) 
98 Wilson, supra note 20, at 378 (“[W]e live in a country that despite its baffling array 
of rules and regulations and the insatiable desire of some people to use government to 
rationalize society still makes it possible to get drinkable water instantly, put through a 
telephone call in seconds, deliver a letter in a day, and obtain a passport in a week. . . One 
can stand on the deck of an aircraft carrier during night flight operations and watch two 
thousand nineteen-year-old boys faultlessly operate one of the most complex organizational 
systems ever created. There are not many places where all this happens. It is astonishing 
that it can be made to happen at all.”) 
99 MARK MAZZETTI, THE WAY OF THE KNIFE: THE CIA, A SECRET ARMY, AND A WAR 
AT THE ENDS OF THE EARTH 14 (2013) (“Hundreds of CIA analysts were now working on 
terrorism, which was understandable in the aftermath of an attack that killed nearly three 
thousand Americans. But it became immediately obvious to the analysts that the path to 
career advancement at the CIA was to start working on terrorism, with the goal of 
producing something that might be read to the president early one morning inside the Oval 
Office.”)  (emphasis supplied) 
100 See, e.g., Ladd Wiley & Steven A. Grossman, Does FDA Have Enough Funding to 
Fulfill its Critical Role in Protecting the Public Health? 1 FDLI FOOD AND DRUG POLICY 
FORUM (2011).  
To be sure, there is always competition for resources, regardless of the number of 
functions an agency is performing. But, combining functions within a single department 
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above water, but doing so means that “law in action” is quite different than 
“law on the books.”  It is also a recipe for recriminations and oversight 
hearings when an issue that didn’t make the cut for regulatory attention 
blows up.101   
Capacity is not the same thing as capability. Capability determines 
whether an agency has the tools to make good decisions, and does so. An 
agency with enforcement responsibilities first needs the statutory authority 
to exercise its will, and an adequate set of remedies with which to enforce 
compliance. Once it is so armed, it will predictably make two types of 
errors: Type I (intervening when it should not, or a false-positive), and Type 
II (not intervening when it should, or a false negative). The institutional 
design question is whether an agency with multiple (and potentially 
competing) functions and purposes is likely to make more or fewer mistakes 
– and perhaps, of which type.102  
A related point. Expansion of the agency’s substantive mandate can 
degrade capability, even if all else remains equal. As the agency’s authority 
grows, its leadership and staff may acquire an exaggerated sense of the 
institution’s ability to perform effectively, and pay less attention to whether 
the agency’s commitments match its capabilities. These circumstances can 
result in agency leadership “over-promising and under-delivering.”  A 
related problem is that the more expansive an agency’s mandate, the more 
likely it is that Congress will turn to the agency to address developments 
that do not fit neatly elsewhere – even if those problems do not actually 
play to an agency’s strengths. Thus, an agency with expansive powers 
becomes a default option for handling the latest problem, regardless of 
whether the agency’s actual capacity and capabilities supply effective 
means for achieving a good solution.103 
Capability is also influenced by the degree to which agency 
personnel self-critically assess both means and ends. When a single agency 
has sole responsibility, the risks of groupthink and tunnel vision increase. 
When multiple agencies share responsibility for a particular area, there is a 
                                                                                                                       
merely shifts the problem to a less transparent setting for resolution. The funding/resource 
allocation problem is necessarily less visible if it is resolved within a single agency. 
Barring a whistle-blower, external constituencies will never learn the details of who wanted 
what – and what is no longer being done with the same enthusiasm, if at all.  
101 See, e.g., AP, Risks of tainted food rise as inspections drop, Feb. 26, 2007, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17349427/ns/health-infectious_diseases/t/risks-tainted-
food-rise-inspections-drop/  
102 In principle, both types of error are equally problematic; it is the overall frequency 
of error that matters. In practice, false positives are viewed as more problematic than false 
negatives, since they are more visible, and the aggrieved constituency can readily mobilize 
in opposition. 
103 As we have detailed elsewhere, the FTC has periodically run afoul of this dynamic. 
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feedback loop for surfacing and resolving disagreements regarding such 
matters, at the cost of having the dispute spill into public view. The 
controversy over the desirability of drone strikes in Pakistan exemplifies 
this dynamic.104  
 
4. Resilience: Is the Existing Assignment of Functions Adaptable 
and Sustainable? 
Statutes routinely allocate jurisdiction according to the technology 
used to supply a product or the status of the organization that provides the 
service. What happens when the character of the industry is altered by 
technological change or the emergence of new categories of suppliers of the 
sector’s goods or services?  Regulatory jurisdictional boundaries can shift 
over time in much the way that the movement of a river will sometimes 
alter rights in real property.105  When such changes take place, multiple 
agencies may seek to exercise authority by arguing that the reconfigured 
industry falls within their purview. A sustainable assignment of functions 
will be able to adapt to such changes; a non-sustainable assignment will not, 
making bureaucratic warfare between the rival agencies a very real 
possibility.106      
Examples of this phenomenon are easy to find. The SEC and CFTC 
waged a decade-long dispute over products that arose at the interface of 
their respective regulatory authority. 107   Financial services regulation 
routinely raises this problem, because regulatory authority is usually tied to 
the type of entity being regulated, and not the type of product being 
offered.108  (The CFPB represents an obvious counter-example, which we 
address below). Border disputes can easily trigger a vicious bureaucratic 
turf war, diverting attention from substantive concerns – particularly when 
the terms on which the dispute is resolved can trigger dramatic shifts in the 
allocation of regulated firms across agencies. An adaptive regulatory 
framework would clearly allocate regulatory authority over a particular area 
                                                
104 See Mark Bowden, The Killing Machines, Atlantic, Sep. 2013, at 58, 65-66 
(describing ongoing conflicts between Department of State, and the CIA and Department 
of Defense over the merits of specific drone strikes, and the larger policy, as well as 
whether the CIA or State would decide such matters.). See also Mazzetti, supra note 99, at 
291-93.  
105 See supra note 75.  
106 Cf. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM 
JURISDICTION 2 (1997) (“As with nations and hunting groups, poorly defined boundaries 
lead to wasteful skirmishes.”)  
107 Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 
1026 (1982); SEC v. American Commodity Exchange, 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); 
SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp 1029 (D. Ill. 1976). 
108 ANNE M. KHADEMIAN, CHECKING ON BANKS: AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THREE FEDERAL AGENCIES 126-127 (1996). 
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to a specific regulatory agency -- instead of forcing personnel at multiple 
agencies to spend considerable time and effort disputing the allocation of 
responsibility.  
Resilience is obviously not as important as some of the other factors, 
because problems will only emerge over time, if at all. But, the absence of 
properly defined jurisdictional boundaries will eventually lead to border 
wars between agencies/departments, and turf wars among congressional 
committees. Creating an adaptable and sustainable grant of regulatory 
authority helps reduce the amount of time spent on such activities.  
 
5. Cohesion  
When discrete functions are combined in a single agency or 
department, the result is usually the creation of separate operating units for 
each function. As individual operating units become more specialized and 
autonomous, they quickly develop norms, goals, and priorities that 
predictably differ from other units in the same agency or department. Over 
time, this process results in units being staffed by personnel whose interests, 
training, and abilities focus narrowly on the work of their unit and have 
little understanding of the backgrounds and activities of other units 
underneath the same institutional roof. Predictably enough, individual units 
start to see one another as rivals for prestige, headcount, and budgetary 
resources.  
This rivalry is usually either beneficial or destructive.109  A final 
possibility is there will be neither beneficial nor destructive rivalry; 
individual units will simply not acknowledge the existence of the other 
units. Issues of culture and history loom large in determining which of these 
three outcomes will result.  
To be sure, such difficulties are likely to arise whether we are 
dealing with a single agency or multiple agencies that are expected to 
coordinate their efforts. And, such difficulties can exist within a single 
department.110  But, matters are often much worse across divisions within a 
single agency or department, such as the legendary conflicts between the 
rival military services contained within a single Department of Defense:  
It was the late 1950s and General Curtis LeMay was the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The Air Force and the Navy 
at that time were vying for who would have the primary 
mission of the strategic defense of the country. The Air 
                                                
109 Rivalry will be beneficial if it results in synergies that serve the larger aims of the 
agency. Rivalry will be destructive if it manifests itself in credit-claiming or other measures 
that enhance the visibility of the operating unit as an end in itself.  
110 More colloquially, these are referred to as the brown shoe, black shoe, and felt shoe 
Navy. Wilson, supra note 20, at 106.  
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Force was advocating its land based strategic bombers and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Navy was advocating 
its ballistic missile submarines and putting nuclear capable 
aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. The debate was heated and 
there was not enough money to do both. The future missions 
of both services were at stake. An Air Force Colonel was 
briefing General LeMay on the Soviet threat versus the 
strategic requirements funded in the budget. The Colonel 
told General LeMay that the Russians, our enemy, were 
capable of . . . and at that point General LeMay stopped him. 
LeMay was quoted as saying, “The Russians are our 
adversary. The Navy is our enemy.”111 
 
Other examples of inter-service attitudes (and their consequences) 
are not hard to find. The Air Force is responsible for close air support of 
ground operations, but, air force culture is “based on flying high-
performance fighters and long-range bombers, especially the latter.”112  Not 
surprisingly, the Air Force historically gave “minimal attention to close air 
support and buys just enough attack aircraft to protect its claim to the close 
air support mission. Meanwhile, the Army, unsure that it can rely on Air 
Force support when it is needed, purchases a vast fleet of attack helicopters 
which, while more expensive than attack planes and potentially far more 
vulnerable, can be placed under direct Army command.”113  
To summarize, the coordination of functions and responsibilities 
will not happen merely because previously separate bureaus are combined 
into a single department.114  Indeed, the more each bureau attempts to build 
esprit de corps and signal that it is truly elite, the less likely “joint-ness” will 
result. Such dynamics have long complicated attempts to deploy “special 
ops” teams from different branches of the military in an integrated fashion – 
particularly when one adds in that special ops has collectively been long 
regarded with collective suspicion by the “regular” military. When one adds 
the CIA into the mix, it is easy to understand why joint-ness has been such a 
challenge.115      
                                                
111  John Melchner, Managing the Budget Process, J. PUB. INTEGRITY 11, 13 
(Fall/Winter, 1998), available at  http://www.ignet.gov/randp/jpifw98.pdf.  
112 Wilson, supra note 20, at 186. 
113 RICHARD A. STUBBING, THE DEFENSE GAME 142 (1986) 
114 See, e.g., DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN, BUREAUCRACY AND 
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 71 (2006) (“A specialist in marine biology may in some 
sense work for the Department of Commerce, but in his or her mind, the job is not with the 
Commerce Department or even with the NOAA, but with the National Marine Fisheries 
Service.”)  
115 Marc Ambinder, The Secret Team that Killed Bin Laden, NATIONAL J. May 3, 
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In like fashion, the CIA has had a long-standing cultural conflict 
between analysts and field agents, as well as ongoing debates between 
internal communities that favor either reliance on high technology 
monitoring systems (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) or “Humint” (on the 
ground in-person collection of intelligence).116  Those who design and 
manage intelligence gathering through advanced technology systems tend to 
have backgrounds in science and engineering. The human intelligence 
community tends to be drawn from individuals with skills in the social 
sciences. Not surprisingly, each individual unit believes it has a monopoly 
(or near-monopoly) on the optimal approach to intelligence gathering and 
analysis, and the efforts of other units are viewed with disdain. The problem 
is not limited to the uniformed services: the U.S. Forest Service has 
experienced similar difficulties as it has expanded from an agency staffed 
solely by foresters to a more diversified ecosystem.117   
As these examples illustrate, the combination of related functions 
within a single department or agency does not mean that good things will 
inevitably result. Indeed, destructive rivalry can mean that 2+2 = 1, instead 
of 4.  
 
6. Collateral Effects on the Regulatory Ecosystem 
The government is already thickly planted with bureaus, agencies 
and inter-agency working groups, departments and commissions, and many 
of these institutions have overlapping authority. The fact of overlapping 
authority typically elicits effort by the agencies with shared jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                       
2011, at http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/the-secret-team-that-killed-bin-laden-
20110502; Greg Miller & Julie Tate, CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets, WASH. POST, Sep 
1, 2011 at A1 (“Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs, but the operation was 
carried out under CIA authority, planned in a room at agency headquarters and based on 
intelligence gathered over a period of years by the CTC. The assault was the most high-
profile example of an expanding collaboration between the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special 
Operations Command, which oversees the nation’s elite military teams. Their comingling 
at remote bases is so complete that U.S. officials ranging from congressional staffers to 
high-ranking CIA officers said they often find it difficult to distinguish agency from 
military personnel.”) 
116 See Mazzetti, supra note 99, at 55-56 (“The CIA is actually a fragmented cliquish 
culture, more like a public high school than many inside the agency care to admit. Jockish 
paramilitary officers tend to shun the nerdy analysts, who regard the paramilitary 
operatives as knucle-draggers. At the top of the pyramid are the case officers – the spies 
who go out in to the world – who believe they are doing the real work of the CIA and like 
to boast that they don’t follow orders from desk jockeys at headquarters.”) 
117 Wilson, supra note 20, at 65 (“foresters dislike the tendency of engineers to elevate 
mechanical soundness over natural beauty, of biologists to worry more about endangered 
species than about big game, and of economists to put a price on things foresters regard as 
priceless.”) 
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coordinate their efforts.118  These efforts do not arise because the agencies 
in question like each other.119  But, agencies generally come to realize the 
need, at least on some level, to avoid destructive duplication and to invest in 
joint activities. In ways that are usually invisible to external observers, 
agencies will spontaneously create a vibrant and interlocking ecosystem of 
cooperation.120   
When circumstances change (i.e., when regulatory tasks are 
reallocated, or a new agency is inserted into the mix, or new powers are 
given to an existing agency), the regulatory ecosystem is likely to be 
disrupted. The new entrant may siphon off money and personnel, making it 
difficult for incumbent agencies to perform their existing responsibilities. 
Reallocation of authority may also upset long-standing understandings that 
formed the basis for fruitful inter-agency collaboration. The entrant may 
receive a substantive mandate whose formal commands resemble the 
language that appears in the statutes of other regulatory authorities. The 
interpretation of the new entrant’s mandate in one judicial could spill over 
into the interpretation of the mandates of other agencies in separate cases.  
To be sure, Congress certainly has the authority to close down an 
agency entirely, or substantially limit its jurisdiction and authority – and it 
knows how to do that when it wants to. But, the kinds of regulatory 
reorganizations we have been describing usually do not reflect that 
objective – meaning that the damage to the regulatory ecosystem is often an 
unintended consequence of Congressional failure to understand that 
personnel would migrate to the new and more glamorous and higher paying 
outpost – leaving other parts of the regulatory ecosystem permanently 
blighted. To summarize, the wisdom and net functional benefits of any 
specific realignment of regulatory authority will depend heavily upon 
                                                
118 Sometimes the deliberate duplication of responsibility stems from Congressional 
desire to test alternative institutional means of delivering a desired policy result. See 
William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement? 
41ANTITRUST BULLETIN 505 (1996). On other occasions it reflects an explicit desire to use 
interagency rivalry to spur performance improvements. See William E. Kovacic, 
Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. LAW J. 
AM. UNIV. 461 (1995). Finally, technological change and market developments can give 
rise to regulatory overlaps “by accident.” 
119 Rivalry among agencies to be seen as the lead institution in a given field of 
regulation is inevitable, as perceptions of primacy influence congressional budgetary 
allocations, affect staff recruitment, and generally shape an agency’s self-image. In 
analyzing the conduct of public institutions, one rarely goes wrong by overestimating the 
power of parochialism and self-interest to warp behavior. 
120 The means of cooperation and coordination range from formal exchange of written 
memoranda of understanding to the creation of interagency working groups to less formal 
(but still important) personal interaction among agency heads, senior managers, and case 
handlers. 
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whether the changes build upon a sophisticated understanding of the 
existing regulatory ecology.  
 
7. Political Implications  
Politics is a major factor in the design and location of government 
agencies and functions, because decisions about where to place certain 
responsibilities are simultaneously decisions about who will resolve certain 
disputes, and, in turn, what the outcome is likely to be.121  When the House 
of Representatives was considering a climate change bill in 2009, the chair 
of the House Agriculture Committee made it clear he would kill the bill if it 
allocated responsibility for determining whether farmers would receive 
credit for “tilling and conservation practices that keep carbon dioxide stored 
in the soil” to the EPA, but would allow it to go forward if responsibility for 
the same task resided in the Department of Agriculture.122  The choice of 
regulatory responsibility for what might at first glance appear to be a 
ministerial task had real significance; “environmentalists and the bill's main 
sponsors feared that the Agriculture Department might use lax standards, 
which would blow a hole through the nationwide cap on carbon dioxide 
emissions.” 123  When President Franklin Roosevelt’s reorganization 
committee proposed that all federal loan programs should be consolidated 
under the Treasury Department, FDR vetoed the suggestion, observing “that 
won’t work. If they put them in the Treasury, not one of them will ever 
make a loan to anybody for any purpose. There are too many glass-eyed 
bankers in the Treasury.” 124   More recently, privacy advocates have 
expressed skepticism about the Obama Administration’s Internet privacy 
                                                
121 See also Seidman, supra note 36 at 137 (detailing how user organizations lobbied to 
have the Army Corps of Engineers placed in charge of the St. Lawrence Seaway, since they 
expected it would adhere to its long-standing policy that inland waterways were “public 
highways open to use of the public generally without restriction,” and would accordingly 
not impose user charges.) 
122  Derek Thompson, The Collin Peterson Climate Change Compromise, THE 
ATLANTIC, available at 
http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/06/the_collin_peterson_climate_change_compromise_
1.php  
123 Steven Mufson, Vote Set on House Climate Bill, Wash. Post, June 24, 2009, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303456.html  
124 A.J. WANN, THE PRESIDENT AT CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR – A STUDY OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS, 1968 at 103-104, cited in Seidman, supra note 22, at 
118-119. For a similar observation about the Federal Housing Authority, see Riley & 
Brophy-Baermann, supra note 114, at 71 (noting that FHA was initially staffed by “real 
estate people and mortgage brokers,” and the “values and prejudices” of those individuals 
resulted in a definition of agency success tied to “the number of loans made and the 
repayment record” – leading it to spend most of its resources on loan guarantees for newly 
constructed single family owner occupied homes – which resulted in the suburbs.  
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proposals because the Department of Commerce is taking the lead, instead 
of a more pro-consumer agency, like the FTC.125  
Once regulatory authority has been allocated in the first instance, 
Congressional committees defend their turf with vigor and panache. In part, 
this is defensible, since there are gains from expertise. Individual members 
gain knowledge and experience with an agency’s operations over a period 
of years. Proposals to transfer regulatory authority to an agency that is 
overseen by a different committee places that investment of intellectual 
capital at risk. Legislators may also be reluctant to allow others to take 
ownership of “their baby,” fearing their successors may not share their 
priorities. Finally, individual members of Congress derive important 
electoral advantages from the committees on which they service, including 
access to campaign contributions from those who are affected by the 
activities of government agencies subject to the oversight of the 
committees. Oversight of a specific government agency creates a revenue 
stream that flows from the affected industry to the committee’s members. 
Reorganization measures that alter an agency’s powers can reduce or 
eliminate the revenue stream to a given committee. This dynamic makes it 
clear why Congress takes a keen interest in reorganization.126 
Agency personnel are acutely conscious of these considerations, and 
will dismiss out of hand organizational changes that create political 
difficulties.127  When agency personnel are not sufficiently sensitive to these 
dynamics, members of Congress are quick to remind them of the error of 
their ways. We observed this dynamic first-hand in 2002, when the FTC 
and DOJ jointly proposed to change the way in which they handled cases in 
which both had jurisdiction under the Clayton Act. Among other features, 
the agreement would have given DOJ exclusive jurisdiction over mergers in 
the the telecommunications and media sectors, while reserving electric 
power, health care, and aerospace to the FTC. Although the proposal 
attracted bipartisan support and was hailed by antitrust practitioners, 
business groups, and former FTC and DOJ personnel, it was ultimately sunk 
by the vehement opposition of Senator Ernest Hollings, who argued that 
mergers among media corporations should be reviewed by the FTC. As 
chairman of the Commerce Committee, Hollings had oversight authority 
over the FTC, but not over the DOJ (which fell within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                
125 See Edward Wyatt, White House, Consumers in Mind, Offers Online Privacy 
Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (“A concern is that the administration’s 
privacy effort is being run out of the Commerce Department.”) 
126 See generally King, supra note 106, at 2 (“For individual legislators, the payoffs for 
winning in turf wars include expanded power, greater prestige, opportunities to make a 
personal mark on important legislation, and improved services to voters.”)  
127  Steven Eli Schanes, Creating NOAA – The Coast Guard, at 
http://schanes.wordpress.com/2008/05/24/creating-noaa-the-coast-guard/  
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Senate Judiciary Committee). Hollings threatened the budgets of both 
agencies unless the clearance agreement was abrogated. Why was Hollings 
so vehement about this issue?  Presumably, he feared that the plan would 
have largely eliminated the flow of campaign contributions he received 
from telecommunication and media corporations, and he apparently 
concluded that any new campaign contributions from electric power, health 
care, and aerospace firms would not be enough to make up the deficit.128   
Similar considerations help explain why the reorganization that 
resulted in the Department of Homeland Security was so politically 
difficult.129  These dynamics tend to freeze in place existing allocations of 
policymaking power and to disable reform proposals that would move 
authority away from some government agencies and give it to others.  
In light of the political phenomena described here, it is tempting to 
simply acquiesce in the inevitability of the existing distribution of agency 
responsibility. But, major exogenous shocks can make substantial 
reorganizations politically possible (if not inevitable) – at which point the 
other six factors become more important in determining the allocation of 
responsibilities among the various bureaus, commissions, agencies, and 
departments that make up the United States government. Finally, the simple 
fact there is an ongoing demand for reorganization, even in the absence of 
major exogenous shocks, means that these issues are constantly in play. No 
one ever permanently surrenders, and there is no final judgment rule 
enforced on the disputants.130  
 
C. What Matters Most?  
                                                
128 This episode is described in greater detail in William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High-
Tech Industries: Improving the Federal Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 George Mason L. Rev. 
1097, 1111-12 (2012). See also Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 15.  
129 Even after the politics made reorganization inevitable, individual Congressional 
committees insisted on retaining regulatory oversight of “their” part of DHS. See Tumulty 
& O’Keefe, supra note 30 at AQ (“the members of Congress overseeing [the agencies that 
were merged into DHS] were loath to give up any authority. That is why DHS gets 
marching orders from more than 100 congressional committees and subcommittees - a 
number that has grown in the past seven years, despite the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendation that those tangled lines of authority be consolidated.”)  
130 Cf. Wilson, supra note 20, at 299-300 (“Public policy making in Europe is like a 
prize-fight: two contenders, having earned the right to enter the ring, square off against 
each other for a prescribed number of rounds; when one fighter knocks the other one out, 
he is declared the winner and the fight is over. Policy-making in the United States is more 
like a barroom brawl: Anyone can join in, the combatants fight all comers and sometimes 
change sides, no referee is in charge, and the fights last not for a fixed number of rounds 
but indefinitely or until everybody drops from exhaustion. To repeat former Secretary of 
State George Shultz’s remark, ‘its never over.’”)  
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We believe that three factors matter most in predicting the long-term 
success of any given agency design: political implications, coherence, and 
capacity/capability –with political support, or the lack thereof the most 
important factor. An agency is doomed if it lacks a supportive constituency, 
or if the performance of its duties generates crippling political opposition.131  
More broadly, an agency will not be able to operate effectively if its 
structure raises serious doubts about its legitimacy or increases the 
vulnerability to political pressure that the performance of its duties will 
arouse.  
The second most important factor is policy coherence. Greater 
coherence increases the likelihood the agency will define its aims more 
clearly, set priorities and design programs appropriately, and develop a 
well-recognized brand. Coherence makes it easier to recruit qualified staff 
and build the necessary capacity to implement whatever programs are 
prioritized. An agency with policy coherence is accordingly better able to 
establish its credibility with external audiences, including the legislators 
who will determine funding and otherwise oversee agency operations. 
 The third most important factor is the agency’s capacity/capability 
to perform its assigned functions. A severe mismatch between the 
commitments in an agency’s policy portfolio and its capacity and capability 
to deliver results is likely to result in highly visible failures, of which 
Congress is usually quite unforgiving. Agencies with an inadequate talent 
pool and frail resources are more likely to generate poorly conceived 
programs, and less likely to execute tasks effectively. The mismatch 
between commitments and capacities creates a grim set of options. An 
agency can engage in policy triage, in the hope there will be no disasters in 
the ignored policy space and that no one cares enough about the tasks that 
are being ignored to make a fuss. Alternatively, an agency can try to cover 
all the assigned responsibilities with the predictable consequence of doing 
few (if any) of them well.  
 Of course, these factors are not independent of one another: an 
agency is more likely to have the necessary resources (i.e., capability) if it 
has strong political supporters. An agency that slights or over-emphasizes a 
portion of its regulatory portfolio is skating on thin ice unless its political 
supporters are on board with that decision. Similarly, without policy 
coherence, an agency is less likely to attract and maintain political support 
in the first instance. Finally, there are further levels of complexity imbedded 
                                                
131 See, e.g., Norton Long, Power and Administration, 2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REV. 
257 (1949) (“There is no more forlorn spectacle in the administrative world than an agency 
and a program possessed of statutory life, armed with executive orders sustained in the 
courts, yet stricken with paralysis and deprived of power, an object of contempt to its 
enemies and of despair to its friends. The lifeblood of administration is power.”) 
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within each of the factors.132 
 Our typology raises other difficult questions. Are all of the factors 
scalable?  Are any of them?  Can one compensate for weakness on one 
factor with strength on another?  Does one need a minimum quantum of all 
of the factors to get off the launching pad?  And so on. These issues must 
await better data and require further research. We now turn to the 
application of our 7-part framework to the CFPB.  
  
V. Application of Our Framework to the CFPB 
Before Dodd-Frank, numerous federal and state agencies shared 
regulatory responsibility for financial services.133 The regulatory status quo 
resembled a century-old house that had passed through several owners; each 
made changes to suit her tastes in architecture.  Every new modification 
took place without apparent concern for the quality of the entire structure. 
The result was a jarring collision of styles that combined a colonial frame, 
some Victorian turrets, a Cape Cod extension, and a modernist wing of 
glass and steel. 
The fragmentation of regulatory authority may have helped cause 
(and may even have worsened) the 2008 financial crisis.134 Reform could 
have taken several different paths. The least disruptive approach would 
have given existing agencies new authority and created stronger inter-
agency coordination mechanisms. 135   A bolder solution would have 
enhanced substantive regulatory controls and consolidated regulatory 
functions in a one public entity. Many observers who had studied the 
existing regulatory framework and its failings preferred to replace the 
existing regime with a clean design – or at least merge the SEC and 
CFTC.136   
                                                
132 For example, capacity is obviously affected by the allocated budget, but does it 
make a difference if the agency is funded with user fees v. dedicated taxes v. general 
appropriations?  To what extent does the mix of funding among these choices reflect the 
impact of other factors – most importantly, political support?   
133  The federal regulators were Commodities Futures Trading Commission, two 
Treasury Department entities (the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Federal Trade Commission, the National Credit Union Administration, and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  
134 The issue is contested, but this view was certainly shared by a majority of 
Congress. Senate Report No. 111-175, at 11 (2010). 
135 On this possibility. see William E. Kovacic, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency and the Hazards of Regulatory Restructuring, Lombard Street 19, 25 (Sept. 14, 
2009) (hereinafter Hazards), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/090914hazardsrestructuring.pdf 
136 See e.g., Steven Rattner, Regulate, Don’t Split Up, Huge Banks, N.Y. Times A23 
(Aug. 1, 2012) (criticizing Dodd-Frank’s limited simplification of financial services 
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Dodd-Frank did more than simply give existing agencies more 
powers, but it rejected a complete simplification of the regulatory status 
quo. Instead, the 2010 reforms took a minimalist path. Dodd-Frank retained 
all but one existing financial services regulator (OTS was shuttered and its 
responsibilities reallocated), while creating a new entity focused on 
consumer credit (the CFPB).137  Even this partial renovation provoked 
divisive debate.138    
 The CFPB originated in a 2007 article by (then-Professor and now 
Senator) Elizabeth Warren, who proposed creating a Financial Product 
Safety Commission.139  The article expressed no opinion about the new 
agency’s optimal location and simply observed that “whether it is housed in 
a current agency like the CPSC or stands alone, the point is to concentrate 
the review of financial products in a single location, with a focus on the 
safety of the products as customers use them.”140  A second article made a 
similar recommendation, while cautioning that agency capture was the 
“main regulatory design challenge.”141    
Although most controversy focused on the CFPB’s desirability, 
there was a parallel debate over where to place the agency in the 
                                                                                                                       
regulatory framework).  But see David Zaring, With the Volcker Rule, the More Regulators 
the Merrier, N.Y. Times Dealbook, Dec. 9, 2013, at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/with-the-volcker-rule-the-more-regulators-the-
merrier/?_r=2 (noting that “even historical accidents have their merits).    
137 See John E. Villafranco & Kristin A. McPartland, New Agency, New Authority: An 
Update on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb. 2012 
(hereinafter Update), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/feb12_villafranc
o_2_27f.authcheckdam.pdf; John E. Villafranco & Kristin A. McPartland, New Agency, 
New Authority: What You Need to Know About the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Dec10_villafranc
o12_21f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
138  See Daniel Carpenter, Institutional Strangulation, Bureaucratic Politics and 
Financial Reform in the Obama Administration, 8 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 825 (Sept. 
2010) (describing struggles over design of new financial services consumer protection 
institutions; Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents at Regulators as 
Overhaul Stumbles, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at 1 (recounting Treasury Secretary 
Geithner’s criticism of various financial regulators for their opposition to plans to simplify 
regulatory framework); Treasury Plans Under Fire, WASH. POST, Aug 10, 2009, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/09/AR2009080902124.html (noting that President Obama left 
most regulators in place to avoid a protracted battle with the existing institutions).  
139 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. Summer, 2007, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf  
140 Id. at 18.  
141 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 
n. 325 (2008). 
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administrative state. Should the CFPB be an independent commission 
(similar to the FTC and CFTC)?  If not, where did it belong – Treasury, 
Justice, the Federal Reserve?  If located inside an existing public body, how 
independent should the CFPB be from traditional forms of oversight?142   
Dodd-Frank put the CFPB inside the Federal Reserve, but insulated 
the bureau from oversight by almost everyone in the federal government.143  
The CFPB’s head is a single director appointed to a five-year term by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate.144 The president may remove the 
director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”145  The 
CFPB operates outside the congressional appropriations process; it funds its 
operations with fees collected by the Federal Reserve – up to twelve percent 
of all fees the Fed receives.146  CFPB rulemaking is overseen by the 
Financial Services Oversight Committee (FSOC), which consists of 
representatives from several government agencies, including the Fed.147  
The FSOC can overrule the Bureau’s rules by a vote of two-thirds of its 
members, but can not influence or limit testimony by CFPB personnel, or 
overrule a decision by CFPB to bring an enforcement proceeding.  
Many individual features of the CFPB are not unique. Other 
regulators with broad powers, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency, are led by a single administrator. For some regulatory bodies 
headed by one person, the director is appointed to a fixed term and may be 
removed only for cause.148 Various financial services regulators also enjoy 
substantial autonomy from the budgetary appropriation process.149 But, the 
                                                
142 For a treatment of these issues, see Kovacic, Hazards, supra note 135. 
143 On these features, see Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: 
Savior or Menace? 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856 (2013) (hereinafter Savior or Menace). 
Dodd-Frank protects the CFPB from interference by its host institution (Federal Reserve). 
Under Title X of Dodd-Frank, the Fed shall not intervene in CFPB examinations or 
enforcement actions; appoint, direct, or remove any CFPB officer or employee; combine 
the CFPB or any of its functions with any other Federal Reserve unit; review, approve, or 
delay any CFPB rule or order; or review or approve any legislative testimony, 
recommendations, or comments of the CFPB director. Dodd-Frank § 1012(c). 
144 Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(1). See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services 
Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 
Rev. Banking & Fin. L. (forthcoming).  
145 Dodd-Frank § 1011(c). 
146 Id. For Fiscal Year 2013, the CFPB will receive nearly $600 million. If the CFPB 
wishes to exceed the ceiling set in Dodd-Frank, it must seek a congressional appropriation. 
147 The FSOC has ten voting members: Treasury, CFPB, CFTC, FDIC, Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, the Fed, National Credit Union Administration, OCC, and SEC. 
Dodd-Frank § 1023. The FTC is not on the FSOC.  
148 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is led by a single individual, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, who is appointed by the President for a five-year term, with 
the Senate’s advice and consent. 12 U.S.C. § 2. 
149 See Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of 
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combination of protections afforded by Dodd-Frank makes the CFPB 
distinctive. And, the bundle of autonomy mechanisms, along with the 
independent-agency-within-an-independent-agency structure, gives the 
CFPB unmatched insulation from the accountability devices that limit other 
federal regulators.  
The CFPB enforces numerous existing statutes (e.g., Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Federal Debt Collection 
Practices Act, Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, and Truth in 
Lending Act) that govern financial services for consumers.150  The bureau 
also received new statutory authority to challenge “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) involving consumer financial 
services.151 
In this section we benchmark the CFPB with the institutional factors 
set out in Section IV, supra.  
  
A. Policy Coherence 
The CFPB has substantial policy coherence.152  All CFPB policy 
assignments seek to protect consumers in financial services transactions. Its 
jurisdiction is broad and covers the extension of credit, the servicing of 
loans, the taking of deposits, real estate settlement services, check-cashing, 
stored payment card systems, collection services, financial advisory 
services, debt collection, and consumer credit reports.153  Congress gave the 
CFPB expansive authority to enforce the law, issue prescriptive trade rules, 
conduct on site examinations, provide guidance to firms and consumers, 
gather data, and issue reports.  
There can be benefits from giving one regulator a wide array of 
related policy measures and implementation tools. At the same time, the 
breadth of tasks and tools creates its own perils. Each function creates a 
distinctive regulatory personality, ranging from prosecutor (enforcement 
actions) to cop on the beat (auditing and examinations) to teacher 
(consumer and business education), scholar (preparation of research 
                                                                                                                       
Banking and Financial Institutions 62 (4th ed. 2009) (describing funding mechanism for the 
Federal Reserve). 
150 Dodd-Frank § 1002(14) defines “Federal consumer financial law” to include Title 
X of Dodd-Frank, eighteen federal consumer protection statutes enumerated in Dodd-Frank 
§ 1002 (12), and certain other laws. See also Villafranco & McPartland, supra note 137, at 
1 & n. 5. 
151 Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b), 1031(b). 
152 Dodd-Frank, Title X, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2005. For a review of the CFPB’s 
authority under Dodd-Frank, see Michael B. Mierzweski et al., The Dodd-Frank Act 
Establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of 
Consumer Financial Products and Services, 127 Banking l.J. 722 (2010). 
153 Dodd-Frank, Title X, §§ 1002(5) & 1002 (15), 124 Stat. at 1956, 1957-60. 
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reports), information clearing house (credit card complaint database), and 
philosopher-king (rule-making). 154   Each function is performed by 
employees with common training and values.  
These discrete functions are likely to give rise to distinct 
departmental cultures, whose differences create internal tensions. 
Enforcement involves selective, ex post intervention and the identification 
of wrong-doers. Auditing entails continuing oversight and monitoring more 
akin to the operation of a public utility commission. The collection of 
industry data and preparation of reports draws upon the skills of 
researchers; these tools provide a decidedly more indirect (and, in some 
cases, more time-consuming) way of shaping policy than filing cases and 
issuing rules.155 The challenge for the CFPB is to develop and maintain an 
internal structure and culture that maximizes the complementarities across 
this range of policy tools, while minimizing the possible inconsistencies. 
Other agencies have had difficulty managing this dynamic.156    
The CFPB’s placement within the Fed scores less well on policy 
coherence grounds. The Fed focuses on macroeconomic policy while the 
CFPB focuses on consumer financial services. The Fed mostly attracts 
attention when it changes monetary policy, while the CFPB is likely to 
attract attention with every major case it brings, and every major rule it 
announces.157  We do not slight the public scrutiny drawn to the Fed’s 
routine exercise of its powers, but we believe the CFPB will attract 
substantially more attention. External observers will have frequent reason to 
question the coherence and relatedness of Federal Reserve and CFPB 
programs considered as a single package. 
            
B. Branding and Credibility 
                                                
154 The CFPB’s power to issue regulations appears in Dodd-Frank §§ 1002(b), 1031 
(b), 1032 (a). The agency’s law enforcement powers are enumerated in Dodd-Frank §§ 
1002(12), 1031, 1036(a) (1) (B), 1052-55. The CFPB’s examination and supervision 
mandates are set out in Dood-Frank § 1026. 
155 The CFPB resembles the FTC’s combination of law enforcement, rulemaking, and 
research functions. On the operation of the FTC’s research function and its relation to the 
Commission’s other policy implementation tools, See William E. Kovacic, The FTC at 
100: Into Our 2d Century (Federal Trade Commission, January 2009) (hereinafter FTC at 
100). 
156 Experience at the FTC has demonstrated that the realization of synergies and the 
exploitation of complementarities does not take place automatically. Id. 
157 On the public attention generated by the exercise of the Fed’s macroeconomic 
policy role, see Age shall not weary her, The Economist, Dec. 21, 2013,d at 97; Peter Coy, 
The Fed’s Overexposure Problem, Bloomberg Bus. Wk, Sept. 9-15, 2013. On the 
prominence of the CFPB’s policy initiatives, see Danielle Douglas, New rules are set to 
curb abuses by mortgage servicers, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 2013, at A15 (describing 
announcement of proposed CPFB rules for mortgage lending). 
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The assignment of policy responsibilities can affect the agency’s 
“brand” and determine the respect it receives from external constituencies. 
A strong brand assists an agency in obtaining healthier budgetary 
appropriations from Congress and in gaining greater deference from 
reviewing courts.158  Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB a strong brand (consumer 
advocate against abusive financial practices), and the Obama 
Administration has promoted that brand (and emphasized its impact for 
middle class consumers) for the past three years. 159   The high 
interrelatedness of the CFPB’s regulatory responsibilities and its 
consistency of purpose will help the CFPB achieve a coherent, well-
recognized brand.  
The same clarity and consistency of the bureau’s brand also poses 
risks. The CFPB is likely to experience a steady diet of consumer protection 
cases involving unfair, deceptive, and abusive conduct. Repeated exposure 
to business misconduct, coupled with a mandate to attack apparent episodes 
of illegal behavior aggressively, could lead CFPB personnel to develop a 
“shoot first, ask questions later” approach to enforcing Dodd-Frank.160    
One way to avoid this problem is to build institutional structures that 
counteract path dependent habits that inflexibly incline professional staff to 
favor intervention. At the FTC, for example, the Commission receives 
recommendations on consumer protection cases not only from case handlers 
within the Bureau of Consumer Protection but also from the Bureau of 
Economics. 161  This approach discourages consumer protection case 
handlers from overlooking regulatory costs and ignoring the role of 
competition and market-based responses in protecting consumer interests. 
Because attorneys know the Bureau of Economics will critique their before 
                                                
158 See William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Competition Agencies 
Signal Quality, Antitrust L. J. (forthcoming, 2014). 
159 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, (July 21, 2010), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-
street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act; (CFPB is “a new consumer watchdog with just 
one job: looking out for people – not big banks, not lenders, not investment houses – 
looking out for people . . . as they interact with the financial system”); Nikki Sutton, 
President Obama Nominates Richard Cordray to Lead Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, White House Blog (July 18, 2011, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/18/president-obama-nominates-richard-cordray-
lead-consumer-protection-bureau (“[W]e are going to stand up this bureau and make sure it 
is doing the right thing for middle-class families all across the country.”) 
160 Cf. Wild, Wild West (1999) (“And you West, not every situation calls for your 
patented approach of "shoot first, shoot later, shoot some more and then when everybody's 
dead try to ask a question or two.")  Similar concerns have been expressed about the IRS, 
where a steady diet of tax evaders can persuade IRS agents that everyone is a tax evader. 
161 Hyman & Kovacic, Divide or Conquer, supra note 15, at 9  
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the Commission, FTC consumer protection attorneys must acknowledge 
economic considerations in recommending cases.162  
The CFPB has created an economic research unit and has hired 
economists with expertise in mortgage markets and consumer borrowing 
decisions. What role will the economists will play in shaping the new 
agency’s culture and programs?  The CFPB might use economic research to 
discipline law enforcement and rulemaking.163  By doing so, the agency 
could resist excessive exuberance for intervention.164  By contrast, the 
agency might treat its economists as subordinate to the attorneys who draft 
rules and prepare cases. These are notably different conceptions of role of 
economists in a regulator with law enforcement and rulemaking powers.  
One sign of the future direction of the CFPB economists is staffing. 
The CFPB hired a prominent behavioral economist (Sendhil Multainathan) 
as its first Assistant Director of Research. Many behavioral economists 
believe insights from research in consumer psychology justify expansive 
regulatory intervention into financial services markets.165  Those who are 
skeptical about the implications of behavioral economics for regulatory 
intervention hotly contest this view.166  The CFPB’s hiring process will 
determine whether such skeptics are welcome within the agency. If the 
agency defines the role of economists as providing support for intervention, 
skeptics are unlikely to apply for positions in CFPB, and if they do, unlikely 
to stay long enough to influence decisions.167 Law enforcement agencies 
that fail to provide a home for at least some skeptics are vulnerable to 
group-think, tunnel vision, empire building, and other regulatory 
                                                
162  Luke Froeb et al, The Economics of Organizing Economists, July, 2008, at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237.  
163 The CFPB has three principal operating units: Consumer Education & Engagement; 
Research, Markets & Regulation; and Supervision, Enforcement, Fair Lending & Equal 
Opportunity. CFPB, Organization Chart, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/. 
There is a Research group within “Research, Markets & Regulation.”  For a doubtful view 
that the CFPB will replicate the quality control provided by the FTC’s economists, see 
Zywicki, Savior or Menace, supra note 143, at 899-917. 
164 The Bureau of Economics performs this quality control function at the FTC. See 
Froeb et al., supra at 162 (discussing influence of economists on FTC decisions). 
165 Not coincidentally, the prominent behavioral economist hired by the CFPB shares 
this view. See Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Eldar Shafi, Behaviorally 
Informed Financial Services Regulation, New America Foundation (2008), at  
http://www.newamerica.net/files/naf_behavioral_v5.pdf  
166 See Zywicki, Savior or Menace, supra note 143. 
167  See Free to Choose? A Symposium on Behavioral Economics, at 
http://truthonthemarket.com/free-to-choose-symposium/. See also Niclass Berggren, Time 
for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics, Rev. 
Austrian Econ. 1 (2012); Mario Rizzo & Glen Whitman, The knowledge problem of the 
new paternalism, 4 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 905, 911 (2009).  
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pathologies.168 These risks are pronounced for the CFPB, given the breadth 
of its substantive mandate, its powerful implementation tools, and the 
absence or relaxation of institutional controls that constrain other regulatory 
bodies.169  In these circumstances, the strong brand created by Dodd-Frank 
may turn out to be a weakness.  
We noted earlier the potential spillover effects of the CFPB’s 
operations on the Fed’s brand. The CFPB’s policy portfolio and 
implementing tools entail departures in form and degree from the Federal 
Reserve’s historical role in financial services. The CFPB’s performance of 
its responsibilities, good and bad, could blur the Fed’s efforts to brand its 
work as a monetary policy technocracy. Even if the CFPB’s brand achieves 
great clarity and wide public recognition, the clarity of the Fed’s brand may 
be diluted.  
 
C. Capacity and capability 
As described earlier, capacity refers to the pool of knowledge and 
resources at the agency’s disposal, and capability refers to the strength of 
formal powers and range of policy instruments. Because the CFPB has not 
yet made enough substantive decisions for us to have a view on its 
performance, we focus on capacity, and the other enabling legislation 
aspects of capability.  
We have already observed that the CFPB possesses a formidable 
array of policy tools with which to accomplish its aims – meaning 
capability is unlikely to be a serious problem. Does CFPB have the human 
resources to accomplish these tasks?  At first glance, it would appear that 
the CFPB will enjoy relatively generous resources. For FY 2013, the 
funding formula created in Dodd-Frank makes roughly $450 million 
available to the new institution.170  
One might think that the seemingly generous allotment of resources 
means that capacity will not be a serious problem. But, Dodd-Frank created 
                                                
168 The dangers of group think and tunnel vision for the CFPB are discussed in 
Zywicki, Savior or Menance, supra note 143, at 875-86. The impulse of public institutions 
to expand their size and influence (empire building) is described in Wilson, Bureaucracy, 
supra note 20, at 179-81.  
169 Cf Richard Thaler, Level Playing Fields, in Soccer and Finance, N.Y. TIMES BU5 
(July 25, 2010) (“Consider the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau now being 
established. Above all, I’d urge the head of this agency to devise rules under the 
assumption that, someday, he or she will be succeeded by a nitwit.”) (emphasis supplied).  
Ramseyer has made a similar argument regarding judges.  J. Mark Ramseyer, Not-so-
Ordinary Judges in Ordinary Courts: Teaching Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1199, 1205-1207 (2007).   
170 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Other Independent Agencies  1296 (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defai;t/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/oia.pdf.  See also 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/budget-in-brief.pdf  
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an extraordinary rulemaking burden at the same time the CFPB was 
opening its doors. In its first year alone, CFPB was charged with issuing 24 
rules.171  Some rules are ministerial, while others involve complex matters 
of policy and procedure.172  Issuing this many rules during a year would 
place a severe strain on even the most well established agency, but 
imposing that obligation on an agency during its start-up period invites 
disappointment. The struggle to complete a hopelessly unrealistic agenda of 
tasks is an invitation for error in the formulation of specific legal 
commands. Some rules have been put off, while the deadlines for others 
have slipped.173  Rules that are completed are unlikely to receive the 
quantity and quality of attention they would get if CFPB’s rule-making 
process were not as overloaded. Affected parties which will challenge the 
rules no matter what they say will now have additional grounds for doing so 
(i.e., the issued rule did not adequately consider the costs and benefits of 
various alternatives because CFPB was overwhelmed).174  The CFPB had 
no role in creating the impossible mandates, but the inevitable efforts to 
postpone implementation or to seek extensions of statutory deadlines can 
hurt the agency’s brand. 
On the whole, the CFPB has fared relatively well in digging out 
from under the avalanche of duties imposed by Dodd-Frank. Through a 
form of regulatory triage the CFPB phased in some operations immediately 
and delayed others. The new agency front-loaded the promulgation of 
procedural rules that described how it will carry out its responsibilities.175  
The agency also initiated a variety of public education programs176 and 
established a database for consumer complaints involving credit cards and 
transactions associated with mortgages, student loans, and bank accounts.177   
At first, the CFPB largely “outsourced” enforcement functions to 
other government bodies (such as the FTC) with shared authority to 
implement financial services statutes involving practices such as debt 
collection.178  Over the past twelve months, the agency has accelerated the 
                                                
171 Davis Polk, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Enacted into law July21, 2010, at i-ii (July 21, 2010). 
172 Id. 
173 Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Progress Report (January 2014). 
174 Our prediction here is based on experience at the FTC, where the effort to complete 
large numbers of complex trade regulation rules in the 1970s led to severe problems with 
quality control. The FTC’s rulemaking experience in the 1970s is examined in Sidney 
Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection: Regulatory Change and 
Administrative Pragmatism, 72 Antitrust L.J. 911 (2005). 
175 Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Progress Report (Apr. 2011). 
176 Perhaps the most notable measure is the agency’s “Know Before You Owe” 
campaign to assist consumers to understand the consequences of incurring debt. 
177 Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Progress Report (Apr. 2011). 
178 J. Reilly Dolan, Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, The FTC 
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tempo of its own enforcement program, announcing the prosecution of new 
cases (some in its own right, others in partnerships with other public 
agencies) and the opening of investigations.179  The principal early objects 
of CFPB enforcement have been credit card issuers. In 2012, the agency 
reached settlements with American Express, Capital One, and Discover to 
resolve charges of misleading sales tactics and obtained restitution totaling 
over $425 million.180 Other focal points for cases and investigations within 
the past twelve months have included debt relief service providers, 
mortgage lenders and brokers, mortgage insurers, and providers of student 
loans.181      
In its rulemaking activities, the CFPB has continued to issue rules 
that describe how it will exercise its authority182 and more recently has 
begun to issue rules that elaborate substantive standards.183  It seems likely 
that CFPB will struggle with the rule-making process for a few years, and 
will not be fully operational, in the sense of executing all of its assigned 
functions for some time.  
This dynamic poses risks to the stability of the political constituency 
that backed CFPB so enthusiastically in the first place. When the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration failed to deliver on the high 
Congressional expectations that inspired the enabling legislation in the first 
place, the agency’s supporters took the lead in savaging its performance. 
One prominent sponsor suggested that responsibility for automotive safety 
should be given to NASA.184    
The CFPB’s efforts to sequence the execution of its assigned duties 
do not affect the capabilities or capacity of the Fed. However, missed 
deadlines, postponements, and other implementation delays are ordinarily 
taken as signs of poor agency performance, no matter how unrealistic the 
                                                                                                                       
and CFPB on Consumer Protection (May 2013). 
179 David Nather, A Fledgling Consumer Board Branches Out, Politicopro, Mar. 25, 
2013, at 8. 
180 CFPB Press Release, CFPB Probe into Capital One Credit Card Marketing Results 
in $140 Million consumer Refund (July 18, 2012); CFPB Press release, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and CFPB Order Discover to Pay $200 Million Consumer Refund 
for Deceptive Marketing (Sept. 24, 2012); CFPB Press Release, CFPB Orders American 
Express to Pay $85 million Refund to Consumers Harmed by Illegal Credit Card Practices 
(Oct. 1, 2012). 
181 Nather, supra note 179; Joe Prior, The Bitter Battle over The New Mortgage Rules, 
Politocopro, Mar. 25, 2013, at 16. 
182 See, e.g., CFPB Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Oversee 
Debt Collectors (Oct. 24, 2012) (describing methods for supervision of debt collectors with 
more than $10 million per year in consumer debt collection).  
183 For example, in January 2013 the CFPB issued new rules on residential mortgages. 
Prior, supra note 181, at 16. 
184 JERRY MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 108 (1990).  
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initial allocation of tasks by Congress. The stigma of failed execution 
attaches to the agency, not the legislators who think that effective 
implementation consists of simply telling a bureau to “make it so.”  If the 
CFPB acquires a reputation for missing performance targets, the Federal 
Reserve’s reputation for administrative competence could be collateral 
damage.  
  
D. Collateral Effects Upon the Regulatory Ecosystem 
The CFPB’s creation will have several distinct collateral effects on 
the financial services regulatory ecosystem. For the most part, these effects 
will increase the cost of carrying out Dodd-Frank’s commands or impede 
the realization of the statute’s aims. In ways that received little evident 
attention in the legislative process, these collateral effects promise to 
diminish the CFPB’s effectiveness and degrade the performance of other 
institutions with responsibilities for financial services regulator.  
Coordination Costs. One major consequence of Dodd-Frank will be 
an increased need for inter-agency coordination. Congress consolidated 
some regulatory functions but left a substantially decentralized policy 
making system in place. As it established the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also 
created new supervisory machinery – the FSOC -- to give other financial 
services regulators some control over the CFPB’s rule making activity.185  
Decentralization means that a significant amount of policy 
integration will need to take place by “contract” (inter-agency coordination) 
rather than “ownership” (merging all regulatory functions into one entity). 
As discussed earlier, coordination costs usually are hidden from sight in the 
adoption of statutes. Where agencies have common policy boundaries or 
concurrent authority, new legislation ordinarily assumes that cooperation 
will be frictionless and costless, but that assumption is simply wrong. 
The CFPB shares authority with other public agencies.186  Shared 
policy domains inevitably require the agency occupants to expend resources 
to cooperate and coordinate policy decisions. The formation of the FSOC 
and the exercise of its supervisory functions over the CFPB also will entail 
                                                
185 Dodd-Frank §§ 1022-23. Dodd-Frank bars the CFPB from promulgating any rule 
unless it first consults with federal banking regulators and other appropriate federal 
agencies about the proposed rule’s consistency with “prudential, market, or systemic 
objectives administered by such agencies.”  Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b)(2)B), 1031(3). The 
FSOC may set aside all or part of a CFPB regulation if two thirds of the committee’s 
members determine that “the regulation or provision would put the safety and soundness of 
the United States banking system or the stability of the financial system of the United 
States at risk.”  Id. at § 1023(a), (c) (3). 
186 For example, the CFPB shares enforcement responsibility with the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development with respect to mortgage financing for individuals with 
low incomes. 
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administrative expense and an expenditure of management and staff time.  
To some extent, the migration of personnel from the FTC to the 
CFPB – discussed below – facilitates policy cooperation. By absorbing FTC 
personnel, the CFPB will better understand the FTC’s culture and 
operations and can use personal relationships to accomplish coordination 
tasks. FTC alumni now employed at the CFPB will be able to use personal 
ties with former colleagues still at the FTC to devise common solutions to 
shared policy tasks. The pre-existing personal bonds can serve to build a 
constructive CFPB-FTC relationship.  
Dodd-Frank directs the CFPB and its federal counterparts to enter 
memoranda of understanding to organize their affairs. In January 2012, the 
CFPB and the FTC signed an MOU to coordinate enforcement efforts for 
shared duties for consumer financial products and services,187 and CFPB 
has negotiated MOUs with other federal agencies.188  Under their MOU, the 
CFPB and the FTC have cooperated on a number of projects, including the 
performance of a joint “sweep” of mortgage advertisements and the 
preparation of a joint roundtable on debt collection.189 
Despite these coordination initiatives, the Dodd-Frank allocation of 
authority seems to have created tensions between the CFPB and the FTC. 
Over the past year, the CFPB has announced plans to require banks to 
exercise greater scrutiny of loan terms for automobile purchase contracts. 
There have been reports that the FTC has complained to the CFPB about 
what the Commission views as an encroachment upon its authority for 
automobile credit transactions.190  It remains to be seen how smoothly such 
issues will be handled going forward.  
Dodd-Frank does not command the CFPB to enter MOUs with state 
governments. State governments retain considerable ability to determine the 
obligations that various financial services providers must fulfill. Dodd-
Frank contemplates that the states and the CFPB will voluntarily establish 
formal or informal arrangements to coordinate law enforcement and other 
policy measures. An MOU may provide a useful platform for cooperation, 
                                                
187  Consumer Protection Financial Bureau & Federal Trade Commission, 
Memorandum of Understanding (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb-
mou.pdf.  
188 See Building the CFPB, 11 (Coordination with Other Entities), July 18, 2011, at  
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf  
189 The focal points of CFPB/FTC coordination have been to ensure that the agencies 
know what each other is doing, achieve consistency in enforcement and policy, curb 
needless duplication of effort, avoid crossing wires on law enforcement investigations, and 
avoid double-teaming of respondents. See Dolan, supra note 178. The agencies have 
committed themselves to notify each other when opening investigations and filing cases 
190 We base this on discussions with FTC officials who have dealt with the CFPB on 
the auto-financing issue. 
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but even these instruments are not self-executing. Those involved will need 
to exert considerable effort to create and sustain cooperative relationships, 
which will place further pressure on the CFPB’s capacity.  
One seldom goes wrong in overestimating the amount of effort that 
agencies must devote to building collaborative mechanisms that work well 
in practice. Dodd-Frank reveals no awareness that this process is neither 
instantaneous nor inexpensive. It is hard enough to establish strong 
interoperability and build a sense of common cause between only two 
government bodies. Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to do so with a 
multitude of federal and state agencies.  
Personnel Migration. Dodd-Frank also has a more direct impact on 
the regulatory ecosystem – specifically on the FTC. Dodd-Frank gives the 
CFPB exclusive authority to issue rules relating to the statutes it enforces, 
divesting the FTC of a longstanding role in this area. The CFPB also has 
more powerful remedies for the areas where it shares enforcement 
responsibility with the FTC. Dodd-Frank also enhanced the regulatory 
powers of other financial services regulators, such as the CFTC and the 
SEC. 
The FTC competes with the CFPB for the same pool of lawyers, 
economists and administrative professionals with expertise in consumer 
protection. All of these entities need individuals with knowledge of credit 
practices, facility in rulemaking and litigation, experience in public 
education, and the ability to perform research. Before Dodd-Frank was 
enacted, the Federal Trade Commission arguably had the most expertise in 
these areas.191   
The CFPB pays substantially higher salaries than the FTC. The 
CFPB is not subject to the same civil service pay scale as most federal 
agencies, and they are able to pay over 30% more than the FTC pays its 
professionals and administrative staff. Thus, an FTC attorney whose 
earnings were capped at $155,000 could earn over $200,000 at the CFPB. 
The CFPB’s mandate makes lateral moves more attractive than they 
previously had been to FTC officials. Dodd-Frank expanded the alternatives 
available to FTC professionals with financial services expertise. The CFPB 
gave the FTC’s consumer protection attorneys and economists the 
opportunity to do challenging financial services work with a substantial 
wage increase. For senior federal employees, the higher wage scale means 
an immediate improvement in current income, Moreover, because federal 
pensions typically are calculated on the basis of their top three years of 
earnings in the federal system, a move to the CFPB can mean several 
thousand dollars more each month of retirement income. 
                                                
191 The FTC’s role in this area dates back to the 1960s with the adoption of the Truth in 
Lending Act and the early 1970s with the adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.. 
   
 
50 
The effects of these disparities are already apparent. By our current 
calculations, over thirty senior FTC employees have moved to either the 
CFPB or the CFTC. This accounts for only a few percent of the FTC’s total 
headcount, but that modest figure does not convey the significance of the 
migration. Those moving include some of the FTC’s best personnel with 
skills valuable in performing financial services regulatory tasks.192  It is not 
as though the FTC is unable to hire new personnel to fill vacancies. In the 
current employment market, the FTC will receive hundreds of applications 
for each position it posts. Many applicants have exceptional credentials. 
What cannot be replaced at will is the know-how and institutional memory 
specific to the implementation of the FTC’s responsibilities. This 
knowledge can be restored over time, but this is a long and costly process. 
The FTC could become a farm team for recruiters from the CFPB or the 
CFTC.  
A regulatory ecosystem perspective makes it clear that we should 
account for both the gains to the financial services regulators and the losses 
to the FTC in evaluating the overall impact of Dodd-Frank. The migration 
of human capital was a foreseeable consequence of Dodd-Frank, yet 
lawmakers gave it no weight in their deliberations.193  Dodd-Frank may 
degrade the FTC’s performance, yet the harm will occur in ways not 
immediately observable. The FTC will lose cases that it would have won, or 
fail to rebuff a legal challenge to all or part of a rule. The agency will forego 
certain projects that demand the highest skills because it lacks the means to 
carry them out successfully. The FTC must either accept an inevitable 
decline in its financial services work or reposition its program, based on the 
new credit practices authority granted the FTC by Dodd-Frank, and the 
residual authority that the FTC retains.  
Federal Reserve Spillovers. The CFPB’s establishment also may 
affect the Fed. Any effect on the ecosystem will be mediated through the 
reputation and branding factors described previously. If the CFPB 
formulates programs that are seen to be sensible and the political storms 
subside, the Fed’s brand as a macroeconomic policy technocracy might be 
enhanced. If the CFPB’s initiatives falter and political controversy persists, 
the CFPB may reduce its host’s stature, and may subject it to the political 
                                                
192 These observations are based on one of our (Kovacic’s) familiarity with personnel 
changes at the FTC. Several examples stand out. Peggy Twohig is now a senior manager at 
the CFPB. She previously headed the FTC’s credit practices unit in the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection. Twohig initially was seconded to the CFPB by the FTC and chose to 
remain. Others who joined the CFPB include Lucy Morris, the FTC’s chief litigator in 
financial services cases and winner of the FTC’s premier award for superior performance, 
and Jessie Leary, the FTC’s leading consumer protection economist.  
193 One of us (Kovacic) met with repeated indifference in attempting to press this issue 
with the relevant legislative committees.  
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winds from which it has long been insulated. 
 
E. Resilience: Is the Assignment of Functions Adaptable and 
Sustainable? 
Dodd-Frank’s assignment of responsibilities to the CFPB is 
adaptable and sustainable, as long as the CFPB does not overreach. The 
flexibility of the CFPB’s mandate and the range of its policy tools will give 
the agency considerable ability to adapt to new circumstances. Perhaps the 
most important likely source of broad “scalability” is the Bureau’s authority 
to proscribe behavior that is “unfair, deceptive, or abusive.”  The unfairness 
and deception elements of this command are modeled on Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which authorizes the FTC to challenge 
“unfair or deceptive” acts or practices.194  The CFPB’s mandate to reach 
“abusive” conduct supplies an invitation to reach behavior beyond the 
prohibitions on unfairness and deception 
The FTC’s experience shows both the promise and peril of scalable 
allocations of regulatory authority. The federal courts have declared that the 
FTC’s unfairness authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act confers power 
to reach conduct not previously condemned by statute or judicial 
decisions.195  For example, the FTC’s emergence as the principal federal 
enforcement body concerning data protection and privacy built upon the 
application of the Commission’s unfairness authority.196    
The FTC’s history also demonstrates that the application of a highly 
scaleable mandate can create two distinct traps. First, legislators and other 
external observers come to regard the agency as a solution for all problems 
that have an apparent connection to the expansive mandate. Congress will 
urge an agency with an elastic mandate to forbid “unfair” conduct to take 
steps to reduce prices for products such as gasoline, even though no 
measures within its control will be effective, and efforts to intervene (e.g., 
to attack price rises as “price-gouging”) may retard market responses that 
eventually cure the problem.197 
Second, an agency with a sweeping, adaptable mandate has 
incentives to extend the boundaries of its authority, to show it is fulfilling 
the goals Congress set for it. Open-ended assertions of authority invite 
carelessness in implementation. Unless the agency exercises great 
                                                
194 See Wilmarth, supra note 144. 
195 Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The 
FTC from 1921-1925, 77 Antitrust L.J. 145 (2010). 
196 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, Colum. L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2014). 
197 See William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Its Influence on the 
Conception of Competition Policy, 11 Competition L.J. 89, 103-08 (2012) (discussing 
congressional demands that FTC take steps to reduce gasoline prices). 
   
 
52 
discipline, it will find it tempting and easy to expand claimed authority 
without rigorously testing the logic for intervention. These lapses eventually 
can provoke severe political backlash, and rebukes from reviewing 
courts.198  
  
F. Cohesion 
As described above, the CFPB’s mandate involves coherent, highly 
interrelated policy making tasks. Were there to be intramural rivalry or 
tension, it likely would result from the diversity of policy making functions 
the CFPB must perform – i.e., among those charged, respectively, with 
bringing cases, issuing rules, performing research, carrying out audits, and 
providing public and business education. As noted previously, this 
phenomenon occurs at multiple agencies. Intramural competition for 
prestige and resources can cause agency officials to spend substantial effort 
refereeing disputes among rival divisions. These resources would otherwise 
be applied to serve program needs. 
Intramural rivalry has other costs. Where individual operating units 
strive to create separate identities, personnel within those units may develop 
loyalty to their own unit and define success in terms of their unit’s 
chievements. Projects requiring cooperation across units may appear 
relatively unimportant, or simply contrary to each group’s interests, even 
though greater collaboration across units would advance projects that serve 
the larger aims of the entire institution. The CFPB may find it difficult to 
mobilize resources across units unless it can create a “we’re all in this 
together” ethos.  
That said, some dynamic tension across units can be helpful. As 
noted previously, the formulation of consumer protection policy at the FTC 
(including financial services) has been informed by the agency’s 
economists. The Bureau of Economics (BE) is a voice for the value of 
competition, for the inclusion of market-oriented strategies in the mix of 
regulatory tools, and for awareness of costs of specific regulatory choices. 
BE also performs empirical research that has yielded major insights into 
how consumers perceive disclosures provided in financial services 
instruments. BE has helped instill within the FTC a culture that encourages 
ex post evaluation to measure the policy results of specific initiatives. It 
remains to be seen whether CFPB will create a similar framework – and 
whether a group likely to be dominated by intervention-minded behavioral 
                                                
198 The experience of the U.S. national intelligence agencies arguably illustrates this 
hazard.  The National Security Administration relied upon an expansive mandate to 
embrace ever broader interpretations of its authority to monitor telecommunications 
transmissions. In doing so, it appears to have failed to impose internal safeguards to ensure 
that surveillance programs adhered rigorously to the limits of its statutory powers.  
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economists will exercise a similar disciplining function.  
What of the prospects for synergy between the CFPB and the Fed?  
Dodd-Frank sought to insulate the CFPB from the Fed, but there are 
considerable overlaps in substantive knowledge and expertise. The Fed has 
deep expertise in credit practices related to the CFPB’s duties. Notions of 
CFPB autonomy might discourage effective interaction. Similarly, if CFPB 
personnel view the Fed suspiciously, owing to its perceived lapses in 
oversight before the financial crisis, cooperation is likely to be seen as a 
negative. We see the possibility for considerable gains from trade, but there 
are policy impulses that might discourage it. 
 
G. Political Implications 
As noted previously, the CFPB has broad authority, but Congress 
dispensed with many mechanisms it has used in the past to balance agency 
autonomy and accountability. The CFPB is headed by a single director, not 
a multi-member board consisting of individuals of diverse political 
affiliations.199  Congress also set aside the ritual of annual appropriations 
and made the Bureau a fee-funded body. It placed this autonomous unit 
within another government body, the Federal Reserve, which itself enjoys 
substantial insulation from the political accountability methods that govern 
other regulators. In general, Dodd-Frank contradicted settled practice of 
tying greater accountability to increases in an agency’s power. 
The CFPB was controversial to begin with, and the enactment of 
Dodd-Frank did not end debate about the wisdom of these institutional 
choices. For many months the White House declined to nominate a 
director.200  As a temporary expedient, President Obama assigned Professor 
Elizabeth Warren to manage the CFPB from a position located within the 
Department of Treasury.201  Warren had played a central role in designing 
the CFPB, and she had become a lightning rod for critics of the new body. 
Republicans in the Congress said they would not confirm Warren or any 
other nominee to be the CFPB’s director without basic changes to the 
CFPB’s institutional architecture.202  These included the removal of the 
CFPB from the Fed, its re-creation as a stand-alone, multimember 
regulatory commission, and the use of annual appropriations to fund its 
operations. In January 2012, President Obama nominated Richard Cordray, 
                                                
199 The choice of a single director raises questions about whether the CFPB is more 
vulnerable to capture because it may require only a single appointment to alter its direction 
(as opposed to the diversification afforded by a multi-member governance structure). Cite 
to commentary on this point. 
200 Deepak Gupta, The Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 Admin. 
L. Rev. 945 (2013). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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the former Attorney General of Ohio to the post.203   The nomination went 
nowhere because it was clear there were insufficient votes to overcome the 
promised filibuster.  
President Obama sought to circumvent this obstacle by using a 
recess appointment.204 This move intensified the already rancorous debate 
about the new Bureau and inspired further debate about whether Dodd-
Frank permitted a recess appointee to head the agency, and whether 
Congress was actually in recess when Cordray initially was appointed.205  
As part of a larger legislative deal involving the NLRB, Cordray eventually 
received Senate confirmation in 2013.206  
Upon taking office with his recess appointment, Cordray 
immediately announced that the CFPB would apply the enforcement and 
rulemaking powers granted by Dodd-Frank. The continuing political dispute 
over the CFPB poses two dangers to the new agency. The delay in 
appointing a director of any sort impeded the roll-out of the CFPB’s 
program. Dodd-Frank specified that the Bureau could not perform certain 
functions until a director took office,207 and Cordray’s delayed nomination, 
and recess appointment led to delays in CFPB coming on-line. This was a 
serious disadvantage for a body given an impossibly ambitious assignment 
of rulemaking and other start-up tasks.  
The circumstances of Cordray’s recess appointment in 2012 have 
created a latent liability for work performed by the CFPB until Cordray’s 
confirmation in 2013. In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruled that President Obama’s appointments of three 
members of the National Labor Relations Board were constitutionally 
invalid.208  In June the Supreme Court accepted certiorari to review the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision.209  Affirmance of the court of appeals ruling could cast 
doubt upon the legitimacy of Cordray’s appointment to the CFPB. If 
Cordray’s appointment was invalid, there would be serious questions about 
the validity of actions taken – notably, the promulgation of rules – during 
the period of the Cordray’s recess appointment.210   
                                                
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 707 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The challenged 
appointments to the NLRB were made on the same day as President Obama’s recess 
appointment of Richard Cordray to the CFPB. 
209 The petition for certiorari was granted on June 24, 2013. 
210 Cordray’s recess appointment has been challenged on the same grounds as those 
advanced by respondent in the NLRB case. The case is pending in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia. State National Bank of Big Spring v. Wolin, Case No. 1:12-
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There is a second danger to the CFPB if political disagreements over 
the future configuration and leadership of the agency are not resolved -- 
even if the recess appointment of Cordray is ultimately upheld. No 
regulatory agency can prosper without an essential foundation of political 
support, and the CFPB faces an enormous challenge to build the political 
capital it will need to succeed. The active implementation of the Bureau’s 
regulatory tools can be expected to create backlash of the sort that many 
regulatory agencies experience. On many occasions, Congress has granted 
broad, nominally powerful authority and then stepped forward to protect 
affected firms that complain about overly “aggressive” applications of that 
authority.211  Every day of the week agencies collect or spend political 
capital. Without a positive balance to respond to future political attacks, the 
CFPB will find it difficult to build and maintain an effective program.  
The rancorous political debate accompanying the birth of the CFPB 
does not bode well for its future. We expect many Republican members of 
Congress will jump on every opportunity to attack the CFPB, and use those 
opportunities to try and revisit the design choices made in Dodd-Frank.212  
Even if formal changes are not forthcoming, various forms of equilibration 
are possible. Courts, for example, could choose to exercise more stringent 
review of CFPB rules, even while professing to adhere to standards 
mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act. Congress could choose to 
demand more frequent appearances by CFPB leadership to explain and 
defend the agency’s programs. Congress also has many other ways to make 
life difficult for agencies that displease it, and the CFPB starts deep in the 
hole on that score.213 
To date, the political brawl over the CFPB has not spilled over to the 
Federal Reserve. Whether disputes over the CFPB affects the Federal 
Reserve will depend greatly on two factors: the performance of the CFPB 
going forward, and the skill of the Federal Reserve in creating a distance 
between its core brand and the brand of its involuntary tenant.  
                                                                                                                       
cv-01032 (D.D.C.). 
211  On the FTC’s experience in this regard, see William E. Kovacic, The Federal 
Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 Tulsa L. 
Rev. 587 (1982). 
212 See. e.g., Rob Blackwell, Why Ethics Charges Against CFPB Vet Raj Date are 
weak, American Banker, Aug. 5, 2013, at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_150/why-ethics-charge-against-cfpb-vet-raj-
date-is-weak-1061115-1.html?pg=2 (“‘A fair number of Republicans hear the word CFPB 
and immediately start seeing hobgoblins and ghosts,’ said Reginald Brown, vice chairman 
of the financial institutions practice group at WilmerHale and a former White House 
counsel during the Bush administration.”) 
213  See Wilmarth, supra note 144; William E. Kovacic, Competition agencies, 
independence, and the political process, in Competition Policy and the Economic Approach 
291 (Josef Drexl et al. eds. 2011). 
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 H. Scoring the CFPB  
How does the CFPB do on the factors we have identified?  The 
CFPB does well on four factors (policy coherence; branding and credibility; 
resilience; cohesion), fares poorly on two (collateral effects on the 
regulatory ecosystem; political implications), and presents a mixed picture 
on one factor (capability/capacity). On the three factors that we have 
identified as most important, the CFPB does well on one (policy 
coherence), mixed on a second (capability/capacity), and poorly on the third 
(political implications).   
It is far too early to draw conclusions about the performance of so 
young a government body, but we offer three tentative predictions.  To be 
sure, there are no guarantees in life or in agency design -- luck, history, 
culture, and the decisions made by senior agency personnel, both at the 
outset and in moments of crisis, all play important roles, and will affect 
whether the CFPB becomes a durable part of the regulatory architecture for 
financial services.   
First and most importantly, the CFPB’s design builds in 
vulnerabilities that will likely prevent it from fulfilling the expectations of 
its creators. Second, the effort to insulate the CFPB from political 
interference will likely embroil it in recurring struggles with Congress over 
accountability for its policies, and may well spill over and damage the 
Federal Reserve. Third, the existence of the CFPB will likely undermine the 
effectiveness of the FTC.   
 
VI. A Case Study of PPACA  
Dodd Frank was not the most significant legislative initiative of 
President Obama’s first term. Far more significant was the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), which mandated dramatic 
changes in the financing and delivery of health care in the United States. 
The challenges associated with PPACA’s implementation provide a useful 
“real-time” case study that complements our analysis of the CFPB. Because 
we anticipate writing another article on the subject, we only sketch out a 
few of the issues here.  
By common consensus, the roll-out of the website, 
www.healthcare.gov, has been a complete disaster.214  The website, which 
was intended to provide a seamless portal to the exchanges that were a 
                                                
214  See, e.g., Ezra Klein, How the IPod President Crashed: Obama’s Broken 
Technology Promise, Businessweek, Oct. 31, 2013, at 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-31/obamas-broken-promise-of-better-
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centerpiece of PPACA, crashed the instant it was launched. 215   Top 
administration officials initially attempted to portray the website’s failure as 
a success story, resulting from high demand and a few “glitches.”216 
Eventually, the administration grudgingly acknowledged the problems, and 
promised to make the website “work smoothly for the vast majority of 
users” by the end of November, 2013.217   
Since then, the performance of the front-end of the website has 
improved dramatically, but serious questions remain about a wide array of 
other issues, including the extent to which administration officials knew the 
website was not ready for prime time, while making public statements to the 
contrary;218 the quality of the information that is being provided to insurers 
after it is collected by the website;219 continued technical problems with the 
website;220 the failure to build in robust security protections for the private 
health care information that is collected by the healthcare.gov website;221 
                                                
215  The PPACA requires most uninsured Americans to secure health insurance 
coverage by registering with publicly-operated exchanges and selecting plans provided by 
various private insurance companies -- or, if they fall below an income threshold, by 
obtaining coverage through Medicaid. 
216 On October 1, 2013, Secretary Sebelius went on network television and said: “we 
have had a few slowdowns, a few glitches, but it’s sort of a great problem to have. It’s 
based on the fact that the volume has been so high and the interest is so high. We’re 
working quickly to fix that.”  See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ8-InZH7LI/  See 
also Sharon Begley, Analysis: IT Experts question architecture of Obama website, Reuters, 
Oct. 5, 2012, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/05/us-usa-healthcare-technology-
analysis-idUKBRE99407T20131005 
217 See Klein, supra note 214. See also Amy Schatz, Exchange Site Needs Hundreds of 
Fixes, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 2013, at A6 (“There is no excuse for what has been a miserable 
six weeks”) (quoting HHS secretary Kathleen Sebelius)) 
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days before HealthCare.gov went live with disastrous results, top White House officials 
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pundits on their expectations for the government’s new health care Web site. . . the fast-
paced PowerPoint briefings showed images of a shiny new Web site that was elegantly 
designed, simple to use and ready for what officials hoped would eventually be a flood of 
customers on Oct. 1. One lawmaker recalled comparisons to Travelocity, the travel 
booking site.”) 
219 See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Contractor blames White House for ‘Obamacare’ 
exchange flaw, Financial Times, Oct. 24, 2013, at 2 (raising issues about accuracy of data 
collected by healthcare.gov website).  
220 Spencer E. Ante & Louse Radnofsky, Three-Hour Outage Echoes Health Site’s 
Flawed Launch, Wall St. J., Dec. 21-22, 2013, at A4. 
221  See, e.g., 
http://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/HHRG-113-
SY-WState-DKennedy-20131119.pdf  
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the decision by the administration to overrule its internal privacy expert, 
and launch the website without the necessary security protections;222 and 
the refusal to release timely information on the number of people that have 
actually secured coverage through healthcare.gov.223  The website launch 
has not been the only implementation challenge; the administration has had 
to repeatedly announce delays and modifications to PPACA (often without 
explicit statutory authority).224  And, the states have faced implementation 
challenges of their own – which have been compounded by the ad hoc 
delays and modifications announced by the administration. 225  Elected 
officials and commentators from across the political spectrum have harshly 
                                                
222 Sharyl Attkisson, High Security Risk found after HealthCare.gov launch, Dec. 20, 
2013, at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/high-security-risks-found-after-healthcaregov-
launch/ (“Fryer told congressional interviewers that she explicitly recommended denial of 
the website’s Authority to Operate (ATO), but was overruled by her superiors. . . Fryer 
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recommending the website's launch be delayed for security reasons.”) 
223 Instead of providing actual enrollment figures, the administration has released 
information on the number of individuals who have selected a plan. It has also not released 
much in the way of demographic information on enrollees. For criticism of these strategies, 
see Seth Chandler, Coverage on January 1, 2014 matters, Dec. 24, 2013, at  
http://acadeathspiral.org/2013/12/24/coverage-on-january-1-2014-matters/ (“it is difficult 
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Americans, despite the problems with the website, are now poised to be covered by quality 
affordable health insurance come New Year’s Day,’ from President Obama at his last press 
conference are just not a substitute for knowing how many people have enrolled in the 
plans in the various Exchanges, and more importantly, have paid for coverage. What are 
their ages? How about some real numbers as a Holiday present?”)   
224 See Robert Pear, U.S. again moves a health plan date, Int’l N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 
2013, at 8 (reporting Obama administration announcement extending the application 
deadline for individuals who can show they missed earlier deadlines due to problems with 
the Obamacare website); Timothy W. Martin & Christopher Weaver, Insurers Rattled by 
Tweaks To the Affordable Care Act, Wall St. J., Dec. 21-22, 2013, at A4 (recounting 
Obama administration’s adjustments to PPACA deadlines). Other ad hoc decisions include 
the one-year delay in the employer mandate, and the “hardship” exemption from the 
individual mandate given to those who had prior coverage that was cancelled). 
Such “government by waiver” creates obvious risks, including the perception that 
government policy is being set to reward political allies and punish opponents. See Louise 
Radnofsky & Melanie Trottman, Health-Fee Proposal Knocked, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 2013, 
at A6 (describing plans by HHS to exempt labor unions and business from reinsurance fee 
imposed by the PPACA); Richard Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 National Affairs 39 
(2011).  
225 See Sandhya Somashekhar & Sarah Kliff, Sebelius assures fixes are being made, 
Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 2013, at A3, A4 (describing problems with state exchanges in 
California, Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont). 
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criticized the website and the roll-out of PPACA.226  
How did we find ourselves in this mess?  The governmental design 
issues we analyze in this article played an important role. Immediately after 
PPACA was enacted, the Obama administration recognized that 
implementation would be challenging, and put together a “high level team” 
to implement what “one insider described as an ‘elaborate implementation 
plan.’”227  One month later, an outside expert close to the administration 
(Professor David Cutler) sent a confidential memo to a senior 
administration official, warning that their implementation strategy was 
deeply flawed and likely to fail.228  More specifically, Cutler was very 
concerned that “the personnel and processes you have in placed are not up 
to the task, and that health reform will be unsuccessful as a result.”229   
Cutler stated that “the early implementation efforts are far short of what it 
will take to implement reform successfully.”230  More specifically, he wrote, 
“for health reform to be successful, the relevant people need a vision about 
health system transformation and the managerial ability to carry out that 
vision.”231   In bold-faced type, Cutler then wrote, “I do not believe the 
relevant members of the Administration understand the President’s 
vision or have the capability to carry it out.”232  For PPACA to work, the 
White House would have to set up “a new structure to focus on where it 
needs to go” and not to pile “new responsibilities onto a broken system.”233 
                                                
226 See, e.g., Unstable condition, Washington Post, Dec. 22, 2013, at A22 (editorial 
criticizing HHS for “continued tinkering” with PPACA requirements and noting the 
resulting disruption); Going public, and private, The Economist, Dec. 21, 2013, at 91 
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227 Jackie Calmes, After Health Care Passage, Obama Pushes to Get it Rolling, N.Y. 
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the memo is posted as an online appendix to this article. The memo, and the underlying 
struggle over implementation is described in detail in Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, 
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Cutler concluded with a call for urgent changes: “I strongly encourage you 
to make changes now, before you are too late to get the outcomes we 
need.”234   
Cutler’s memo provides his perspective on the institutional 
dynamics that resulted from the assignment of implementation 
responsibility for PPACA to HHS, and within HHS to the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services. Indeed, Cutler identified this decision as “a 
central concern.”235  Cutler paints a dismal portrait of CMS: “the agency is 
demoralized, the best people have left, IT services are antiquated, and there 
are fewer employees than in 1981, despite a much larger burden.”236  Cutler 
cuttingly continues, “you have an agency where the philosophy of health 
system reform is not widely shared, where there is no experience running a 
health care organization, and where the desire to move rapidly is 
lacking.”237   Worse still, HHS and CMS displayed little understanding of 
what it would take to make the health care exchanges work properly.238 
Cutler further observed that problems were not limited to the 
operational level:  
The overall head of implementation inside HHS, Jeanne Lambrew, 
is known for her knowledge of Congress, her commitment to the 
poor, and her mistrust of insurance companies. She is not known for 
operational ability, knowledge of delivery systems, or facilitating 
widespread change. Thus, it is not surprising that delivery system 
reform, provider outreach, and exchange administration are 
receiving little attention. Further, the fact that Jeanne and people like 
her cannot get along with other people in the Administration means 
that the opportunities for collaborative engagement are limited, areas 
of great importance are not addressed, and valuable problem solving 
time is wasted on internal fights. 
 
Cutler concludes his memo with recommendations for “a major change at 
HHS,” including “a revamped and enhanced implementation group.”239  
The new team would include individuals with expertise in managing large 
and complex enterprises, health care payment reform, information 
technology systems, outreach and education to reach health care providers 
and insurers, and state coordinators.240   
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The advice in Cutler’s memo was ignored. Of course, Cutler was not 
focusing on the risk of website failure. And, even if the Administration had 
heeded Cutler’s advice, there is no guarantee that the same problems (or 
other, more severe problems) would not have materialized. But, it is striking 
that Cutler’s memo highlights the importance of two of the three factors that 
we have identified as most important (e.g., coherence and 
capacity/capability). And, it is equally striking that one of the proposed 
“fixes” now being considered for addressing the dysfunction of the federal 
health insurance marketplace is to transfer authority away from CMS to a 
“CEO-type figure with clear authority and knowledge of how insurance 
markets work.”241   
Cutler does not mention politics – the third of the three factors we 
have identified as most important. Politics would have created a hostile 
environment in which to launch PPACA even if the best management team 
in the world had been in charge of its implementation – which was clearly 
not the case. 242   Only naked political calculation can explain the 
administration’s decision to assign implementation responsibility for 
PPACA to CMS; to delay many of the implementation decisions and 
enabling regulations until after the 2012 election (and disclosure of some of 
those decisions, even when they had been made before the 2012 election); 
and to give upbeat presentations promoting the roll-out, and hide all 
evidence that things were not going well.243  Indeed, one prominent staffer 
                                                
241 David Morgan, U.S. Government Urged to name CEO to run Obamacare market, 
Reuters, Dec. 29, 2013 (“Advocates have been quietly pushing the idea of a CEO who 
would set marketplace rules, coordinate with insurers and state regulators on the health 
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woes that crippled the federal HealthCare.gov insurance shopping website and the flurry of 
sometimes-confusing administration rule changes that followed.”) 
242 See Goldstein & Eilperin, supra note 228 (“‘They were running the biggest start-up 
in the world, and they didn’t have anyone who had run a start-up, or even run a business,’ 
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defended such tactics on political grounds: “Some Democrats said that, 
given the Republican assault on the measure, the White House was right to 
deliver upbeat presentations promoting it. ‘To downplay expectations would 
have fed into the Republican narrative,’ said Jim Manley, a former top aide 
to Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader, who attended a 
session in the Roosevelt Room of the White House with other allies of the 
administration.”244  
 It is too early to tell how the political winds will affect the future of 
PPACA, and the agencies charged with its implementation. But, if PPACA 
cannot deliver on the promised benefits in short order, we predict the 
emergence of a (likely bipartisan) coalition for retooling (and maybe even 
repealing) large portions of the PPACA. The probability of this occurring is 
significantly higher if (i) the exchanges fail to enroll sufficient numbers of 
healthy individuals (which will trigger an increase in the cost of coverage, 
rather than the decrease repeatedly promised by President Obama), with   
consumers receiving notice of those rate increases immediately before the 
mid-term election in November, 2014; or (ii) large numbers of people lose 
their grandfathered coverage, and find the new coverage unsatisfying (either 
because it is too expensive, or because they are unable to continue seeing 
their preferred doctors); or (iii) there is a significant breach in the privacy of 
the information collected by healthcare.gov. Of course, this is only a short 
and highly selective list of three readily identifiable risks to PPACA; other 
known and unknown risks will emerge (or not) over time.  
 Finally, PPACA’s flawed implementation poses risks to the 
reputation of the regulatory state as a whole.245  If PPACA fails to meet its 
publicly announced goals, the decline in public confidence is likely to be 
generalized, and will affect the functioning of the government well beyond 
the PPACA and health care. 
VII. Implications for Administrative Law 
To this point, we have focused on describing our analytical framework, 
and applying it to the CFPB and the PPACA. In this section, we briefly note 
the implications of our analysis for administrative law. More specifically, 
do our findings have any implications for the endless debates over 
Chevron/Mead/Skidmore deference?  In our view, if the basis for deference 
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of 2012 election to avoid controversy, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 2013.  
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N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2013 (“Over the next few years, the implementation will either go 
more smoothly and build faith in federal competence or go as it has been and destroy it.”) 
   
 
63 
is expertise, then the details of agency design should matter in deciding 
whether an agency is, in fact entitled to deference. Indeed, even if the stated 
basis for deference is democratic legitimacy (i.e., Congress delegated a task 
to the agency, and the court is required to defer to that delegation), that only 
moves the inquiry one level down – since the primary reason for Congress 
to have delegated an issue to a particular agency is because of its 
expertise.246   
To be sure, tying the degree of deference to the ever-changing 
details of agency design makes the doctrine even less predictable than it is 
already.247  But, if the justification for deference is expertise, it is hard to 
understand why one would ignore the question of whether the agency, in 
fact, has such expertise.248 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
In previous work, we identified seven factors that we believe are 
helpful in determining whether the combination of particular functions 
and/or goals within a single government agency or department is likely to 
work out well or poorly. When we apply these seven factors to the CFPB, 
we find that it scores well on several factors, but exceedingly poorly on 
others. It remains to be seen how things will play out, but our analysis 
suggests future difficulties are likely. Our brief discussion of the 
implementation difficulties with PPACA suggests similar dynamics are 
likely to dog health reform going forward.  
In Washington, it has long been a truism that “personnel are policy.”  
We believe that it is equally (if not more) a truism that “placement is 
policy.”  Where an agency is located, and what its street-level operators do 
on a day-to-day basis has a profound influence on the policies that will 
result. Time and again, one finds that the culture of a department, bureau, 
agency, and commission has a disproportionate impact, irrespective of the 
politics of the person who happens to be temporarily residing at 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue.  
Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano 
candidly admitted that when he served in the Johnson White House, “often 
                                                
246 Of course, there can be other reasons for delegation, such as the desire by Congress 
to be seen as “doing something” about a problem. Such “bubble laws” often have 
unintended consequences. See Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 77 
(2003).  
247 That said, there may be benefits in making the doctrine less predictable. See Jud 
Matthews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2013) 
248 See Cohen, Cuéllar & Weingast, supra note 61. Courts must already face this issue, 
when deciding whether to give deference when two agencies share authority, but only one 
agency has been heard on the subject. See Gersen, Designing Agencies, supra note note 52, 
at 353-357.  
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we didn’t know where to put a program. . . and we didn’t particularly care 
where it went; we just wanted to make sure it got enacted.”249  For too long, 
legal scholars have taken an equally casual attitude toward the issue of 
agency design, and instead focused on case studies of individual agencies 
and the “greatest hits” of administrative law (e.g., delegation of powers, 
judicial review of agency actions, and the procedural requirements of 
administrative rulemaking and adjudication). Every taxi driver in 
Washington D.C. may know that “government organization has serious 
implications for policy outcomes,” but the majority of legal scholarship on 
the administrative state demonstrates little attention to this simple point.250   
Stated bluntly, agency design has long been the Rodney Dangerfield 
of administrative law: it gets no respect.251  We think it is time for the issue 
of agency design to command greater attention – particularly from those 
who find fault with our analytical framework, or have a more optimistic 
spin on the CFPB and the implementation of PPACA. Who does what 
matters – and sometimes it matters more than everything else combined.  
                                                
249 Timothy B. Clark, The Power Vacuum Outside the Oval Office, NATIONAL J. Feb. 
24, 1979.  
250 For the exceptions, see supra notes 53-64, and accompanying text.  
251 See Lewis, supra note 65, at I (“Not many people find the study of American 
bureaucracy a provocative or compelling subject”)  
